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18 August 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1610

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VAN AGT, SCHMIDT DISCUSS 1983 STATIONING OF CRUISE MISSILES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 30 Jun 80 p 3

[Text] Rotterdam 30 June (ANP)--Accelerated stationing of cruise missiles with an atomic warhead is to be feared in Europe after 1983, if the Russians do not stop the weekly installation of a missile aimed at Europe. Not a single nuclear weapon in the shape of a Pershing or a Tomahawk will be added on the western side, for the simple reason that they are not yet deliverable.

Prime Minister Van Agt said that Sunday afternoon at Zestienhoven Airport near Rotterdam, after arriving from Hamburg. He had a conversation there with Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Schmidt urged not installing any cruise missiles before 1983 and negotiating with the Soviet Union to limit the armaments race. The federal chancellor left today for a visit to Moscow.

Natural Gas

Van Agt also discussed the export of Netherlands natural gas with his FRG colleague. The Germans think that their market gardeners are victims of unfair competition and want the Netherlands to increase natural gas prices for its own market-gardeners, in every case. However, Van Agt wonders if it is possible to increase that price.

Schmidt showed understanding of the Netherlands arguments, but the two government leaders have not yet reached an agreement. According to Van Agt, the conversations probably are headed in the right direction. Half of Netherlands gas is exported to the FRG.

EC

Van Agt also held a "searching" discussion with his FRG colleague about the EC's financial burdens in the coming year. The FRG thinks it pays too much in proportion to what it receives in benefits. Therefore, Schmidt wants a ceiling on income, especially for the Benelux countries.

Van Agt does not support Schmidt's point of view. He thinks reasons exist to radically reconsider European agricultural policy. The two countries will soon discuss that further.

Van Agt also "defended" the candidacy of the Luxembourger Thorn with his German colleague. He did not want to say any more about it than that "Thorn is a good opportunity."

Port of Dollard

A memorandum is also expected soon about the future of the port of Dollard. The two neighbors have not yet agreed about the use and the arrangement of this port located in the northeastern Netherlands.

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ORGANIZATION, MATERIEL, MISSION OF INFANTRY DETAILED

Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French May, Jun 80

[Article in two parts by G. Turbe: "The French Infantry in 1980"]

[May 80, pp 27-35--Part I]

[Text] At times neglected and at times the object of greatest interest, at all times present on the battlefield, the infantry has always been the foremost close combat weapon.

Despite the high vulnerability of its constituting element -- man -- in the presence of all sorts of agents capable of rendering him inoperative (conventional fire or NBC, psychological aggression, moral or physical exhaustion). The infantry derives its value from its undeniable adaptability, the flexibility of its utilization, as well as its aptitude to fight on all terrain and under difficult atmospheric conditions, by day and by night.

Sorely tested by artillery fire during World War I, tossed about by the German Panzers in 1940, the infantry entered upon a new critical phase with the emergence of nuclear weapons and their devastating effects on all that is unprotected.

Relegated to a relatively secondary role during the three decades that followed World War II, the infantry acquired greater importance with the adoption of the new 1977-type organization, its higher mobility (land and air), and the introduction of more powerful and better adapted weapons.

Because of the variety of its missions and its range of action, the French Infantry is organized in various types of units:

Mechanized infantry regiments
Motorized infantry regiments
Paratrooper regiments
Mountain Units

Divided into two distinct services -- the Home Infantry and the Marine Infantry -- practically all these bodies are now regrouped within large units.

Chart 1. Mechanized infantry regiment



Key: (A) Mechanized infantry regiment
(B) Communications section
(C) Information/Reconnaissance section
(D) Protection section
(E) Administrative services section
(F) Medical section
(G) Servicing and repairs section
(H) Gasoline and ammunition supply section
(I) 120-mm mortar section -- six mortars, eight VAB
(J) CCAS command section
(K) Tank company
(L) Echelon command section

(M) Tank section
(N) Mechanized section
(O) Mechanized company
(P) Anti-tank section

What is the organization and what are the means and missions of this new formula? Are they really adapted to the major current threat? What are the Army's future prospects? These are fundamental questions which will be examined in the chapters which follow.

Mechanized Infantry Regiments

Since 1977, all mechanized regiments belong to the infantry; together with tank regiments they form the battle elements of the new Large Armored Units.

Each of the eight armored divisions (DB) of the French Army--Fourth DB, Sixth DB, Seventh DB, and 10th DB, composing the First Army Corps (CA); First DB, Third DB, and Fifth DB, forming the Second CA; and the Second DB, affected to the Third CA -- has two identical mechanized infantry regiments (16 in all).

Organization

Ultimately, that is when all the new materiel becomes available, the regiments will uniformly consist of:

950 men (of which 49 officers and 143 non-commissioned officers), 20 AMX-30, 44 AMX-10 P and PC, 20 VAB, 120 wheeled vehicles, six 120-mm mortars, and 16 Milan firing stations.

Means and Characteristics

With its 20 AMX-30 tanks, its six 120-mm heavy mortars drawn by VAB wheeled armored vehicles, its 16 Milan firing stations transported by eight AMX-10 P tracked armored vehicles, and its 10 combat sections composed of 240 men armed with 30 LRAC Mle F1 and 30 7.5-mm AA-52, or 7.62-mm AA F1 automatic rifles, also transported by 30 AMX-10 P vehicles, the mechanized regiment has an excellent anti-tank fire power -- 105-mm tank guns (maximum range of 2500 m on a 2 m by 2 m target), Milan rockets (useful range on moving target of 300-400 m to 1900 m), 89-mm LRAC (useful range on moving or stationary target of 315 m), rifle grenades (range of 75-80 m) -- as well as strong fire power against lightly armored or unarmored vehicles, and against personnel -- 105-mm tank guns (maximum direct fire range of 3500 m), 120-mm mortars (maximum range with additional propulsion of 13,000 m), 20-mm F2 automatic guns on tanks and VTT (practical range of 1000 m for lightly armored vehicles, 1200 m for personnel, and 2000 m for neutralizing fire), as well as heavy and light machine guns.

For anti-aircraft (AA) self-defense, the regiment depends on 64 20-mm guns with a useful range of 1500 m in AA fire, mounted on AMX-10's (primary turret weapon) and AMX-30's (coaxial weapon equipped with an overtilt device), as well as on a large number of light and heavy machine guns. Sufficient under normal circumstances, these means would undoubtedly be rapidly overcome in case of intense air and land activity if the unit cannot be reinforced with specialized systems or if it finds itself in an unfavorable position (a matter of selecting priority objectives). We should point out that this observation is equally valid for tank regiments.

The mechanized unit is further characterized by its wealth of means of communications (nearly 200 VM 134, VP 5, 13, 113, and 213, and PP 11 and 13 radios), high mobility on roads and cross-country, a good ability to cross waterways -- either amphibiously in the case of AMX-10 P, or submerged in the case of AMX-30 -- as well as good protection against battlefield "armor"; and it can also operate satisfactorily in environments contaminated by NBC agents.

Utilization

As a multifaceted element of the Armored Division, the mechanized infantry regiment is capable of alternately conducting shock operations and operations which require high maneuverability. However, it is under the latter circumstances that the unit will be most effective. Because it is relatively vulnerable in open terrain and because the quantity of its different individual categories of battle elements (20 tanks, 30 VTT, and 240 fighting men)* is after all limited, it is not in condition to conduct lasting attack operations.

In this respect one can ask whether the reduced number of tanks and the preferential missions which are usually assigned to them (attack, counter attack, exploitation of nuclear fire) provide the best possible utilization for these tanks assigned to the infantry. It might have been more logical to leave them in the armored branch, even at the expense of adopting a lighter anti-tank materiel in the AMX-10 family (the PAC 90 for instance), less costly to buy and operate, more discreet, and practically as effective in restricted firing areas (ravines, forests, populated areas), at night, or under poor visibility.

The missions of the mechanized regiment are extremely diversified; they range from information gathering, to defensive action, or to participation in the exploitation of nuclear fire.

During the initial phases preceding the engagement of the division, it is generally assigned security missions (information gathering, neutralization or destruction of advanced enemy forces, coverage of friendly emplacements).

---

* This nevertheless represents the equivalent of a Russian tank batallion and a mechanized batallion combined.

Once contact has been established with the major forces of the opposition, its utilization will differ depending on the current tactical situation:

In offensive situations, it will attack successive objectives, reduce resistance (notably anti-tank weapon systems), and infiltrate the opposition so as to disorganize it;

In defensive situations, it will stem the progress of the enemy, and if possible, will block him by launching counter-attacks or strikes, or by holding a point or a zone. It is quite obvious that given the nature of the regiment's elements and composition, these actions will preferably be brutal, brief, and repeated.

Before an attack that uses nuclear fire, the mechanized regiment will find itself most often in contact with the enemy in order to prepare the engagement of the division. In subsequent phases, it must cover, facilitate, and complement the actions of tanks.

Although called upon to cooperate very closely with the tank regiments of the division, the regiment is as a rule indivisible and acts in a single direction. On the other hand, its component combat companies act either as homogeneous or mixed units, notably during marches toward the enemy or when it becomes necessary to enter covered or populated areas. Its engagement zone is 5-6 km deep into an action zone whose width can often reach tens of kilometers.

Compared to armored units, the larger number of elements capable of fighting on foot lends the mechanized formations greater potential when operating at night, under poor visibility, or when necessary to cross waterways.

Major Materiel of the Mechanized Infantry

The primary fighting vehicle of the French Mechanized Infantry is the AMX-10 P. Mass produced since 1973, it replaces the AMX-13 VTT introduced during the 50's. It will form the backbone of mechanized or transported elementary units until the end of the century.

The AMX-10 P has road and cross-country capabilities equal to those of tanks, as well as good amphibious specifications. Its light-alloy armor provides sufficient protection against small caliber projectiles (up to 14.5 mm head-on) and artillery shell shrapnel; its pressurization and filtration system also shelters its personnel -- one driver, one weapon operator, and a combat group of 49 men -- from NBC fallout.

The major weapon of the two-man turret with its 360 degree motion, is a 20-mm automatic gun alternately capable of firing against armored or non-armored land targets, and against aircraft.

Its perforating shells can penetrate 20 mm armors at a 60 degree incident angle; under present circumstances, however, this caliber is inadequate against new materials, and in particular against the Russian BMP-1. The

adoption of a 25-30 mm weapon (or at least of more powerful ammunition) could return the advantage to the AMX-10 P by enabling it to engage with better efficiency and at longer range, all current light armored vehicles (up to 1200-1500 m) and air targets, notably helicopters (up to 2000 m).

It would also be desirable if the VTT were able to destroy tanks up to intermediate distances. All this would require is the installation of a launcher for light anti-tank missiles, operated from inside the vehicle.

We also regret the absence of firing slots for light weapons in the sides and rear of the vehicle; this facility would avoid the need for the personnel -- whose numbers are limited -- to disembark and needlessly expose itself when it must protect the vehicle from close attack, or when it must rapidly cross areas that are contaminated, rough, or lightly held by infantry.

The other basic vehicle of the tank regiment is the AMX-30 tank. It is gradually being substituted for the light AMX-13 tank with 90-mm gun, being used by tank companies of mechanized regiments.

Compared to the previous materiel, the AMX-30 is characterized by much more considerable fire power against tanks and personnel (one 105-mm gun, one 20-mm coaxial gun with 40 degree tilting device for anti-aircraft fire, one 7.62-mm machine gun, and four smoke-pot launchers), greater mobility on roads and cross-country (65 km/h maximum on roads, 40 km/h average cross-country, autonomy of 600 km on roads or 18 hours in combat, ability to ford 1.60 m without preparation or to submerge to 4 m), and definitely more effective protection against sustained fire (up to 20-mm caliber head-on), artillery shells, and especially NBC fallout (pressurization-filtration system).

Because of this materiel, mechanized units can conduct brutal and localized offensive actions independently; it also endows the mechanized infantry with its specific character mid-way between the armored service and infantry.

This approach nevertheless elicits several observations:

It deprives the armored service of a significant portion of its specific means, although it is true that in return the infantry loses an equal proportion of VTT's;

It tends to complicate technical maintenance by multiplying the types of armored vehicles in any one unit; mechanized regiments previously included a single family of vehicles (AMX-13), whereas they now have three (AMX-10, AMX-30, VAB);

It requires significantly heavier means of supply, since a medium weight tank consumes definitely more fuel and munitions than a light armored vehicle;

Chart 2. Infantry division



Key: (A) Infantry division.
Manpower: 6900 (Eighth, 12th, 14th, and 15th DI)
7600 (Ninth DI Ma.)
Armored vehicles: 36 AMX-10 RC (Eigth and 14th DI)
or 60 AML (12th and 15th DI, Ninth DI Ma.)
and 382 VAB (all except the Ninth DI Ma.)
Unarmored vehicles: 1750 (Ninth DI Ma.) or 1200 (all others)

(B) Headquarter company
(C) Communications company
(D) Transportation squadron
(E) Medical company
(F) ABC regiment
(G) Combat squadron (AML or AMX-10 RC)
  a) 36 AMX-10 RC (Eigth and 14th DI) or 60 AML, of which 36 AML 90 (others)
  b) 12 VAB/HOT for the anti-tank squadron
  c) 24 Milan stations on jeeps distributed among the combat squadrons
(H) Anti-tank squadron (not yet installed)
(I) Motorized infantry regiments
  a) Their composition is shown below
  b) The Ninth DI Ma. has a third motorized infantry regiment
(J) Gunnery battery
  a) 4 x 6 155-mm drawn guns (future model)
  b) During the transitional period, three batteries of six 155-mm BF 50 howitzers
  c) The Ninth DI Ma. RA includes two ground-to-ground batteries and two ground-to-air batteries
(K) Engineers company. Support sections with specific vehicles and light crossing materiel. Motorized combat section.

It often does not allow tanks to make the best use of their range, given the particular terrains of action of mechanized regiments;

In our opinion, the a priori allocation of various combat materiel lacks flexibility compared to the integrated units (at regimental level) trained for perfect symbiosis.

Remarks

The substance of the above concerning organization, means, and potential obviously applies to those units which are equipped with the new materiel (AMX-30, AMX-10 P/PC, VAB).

Total deliveries to date have made it possible to equip approximately half of the mechanized regiments; for the remainder, replacement of obsolete vehicles (AMX-13 VTT, AMX-13 with 90-mm guns) will take place at an average rate of three units every two years (based on expected deliveries). We therefore must not expect the mechanized infantry to reach its normal combat potential before 1985 or 1986.

Motorized Infantry Regiments

Traditional infantry, of the kind that used to fight on foot and composed the "large battalions," no longer has a place in today's major armies.

Today's infantryman, when he is not aboard cross-country vehicles (trucks or vans) or armored vehicles, is transported by plane or helicopter.

Motorized infantry regiments are likely to play a greater and more active part than in recent decades, because they are more substantial, better armed and equipped, and for the most part regrouped within large infantry units.

Organization

In addition to the eight armored divisions already listed, there are five infantry divisions (DI):

The Eighth DI (stationed in Amiens)
The 12th DI (stationed in Rouen)
The 14th DI (stationed in Lyon)
The 15th DI (stationed in Limoges)
The Ninth Ma. DI (stationed in St Malo), which belongs to the Intervention Forces.

Each of these is composed of -- or will theoretically include -- the elements shown in chart 2.

In addition to the infantry regiments comprising the divisions just mentioned, each of the three army corps is also assigned a motorized infantry regiment.

Depending on their organization and the means of transportation available to them, three different types of motorized infantry units can be identified.

a) Army Corps Motorized Infantry Regiment

b) Infantry Division Motorized Infantry Regiment (on VAB's)

c) Infantry Division Motorized Infantry Regiment (on All-Terrain Vehicles)

Number: 10 (three each for the 12th and 15th DI, and four for the Ninth DI Ma).

The unit uses tactical vans instead of VAB's. This is actually the only aspect that makes it different from the preceding unit.

However, this is a temporary situation for the 12th and 15th DI units, since they will eventually switch to VAB's.

In conflict situations, 14 call-up divisions, each composed of three motorized infantry regiments (derived units) would complement the active forces.

Chart 3. Army corps motorized infantry regiment



Key: (A) Motorized infantry regiments
Three in number (one per army corps)
1400 men -- 95 VAB version VTT (1) -- 155 wheeled vehicles--
44 Milan stations -- Six 120-mm mortars -- Eight 81-mm mortars --
Some 15 20-mm automatic guns

(B) CCS. Sections: General staff, communications, medical, CCS command, technical services, gasoline-ammunition supply, administrative services, protection

(C) Echelon command section

(D) Section of six 120-mm drawn mortars

(E) Section for jeep reconnaissance

(F) Anti-tank company

(G) Anti-tank section -- six VAB-mounted Milans
(H) Combat companies
(I) Command and support section with two 81-mm mortars, two Milan (1 VAB), two 20-mm guns
(J) Combat sections with four VAB's, three combat groups, five LRAC's, and three FM's. Transitional organization: three combat sections per company

Means and Characteristics

In addition to their command and logistics means, motorized infantry regiments have their own separate resources:

Combat: 550-600 men equipped, in addition to their individual weapons, with 64 7.5-mm caliber AA-52 or 7.62-mm caliber AA-F1 automatic rifles, who are assigned throughout the 16 combat sections;

Anti-tank: 16 (DI infantry regiments) or 44 (CA infantry regiments) Milan firing stations, nearly 100 89-mm LRAC Mle F1 (five to each combat section), and an equal number of grenade-launching rifles (in the future, all men armed with FAMAS -- nearly three-quarters of the regiment -- will be able to launch grenades);

Reconnaissance: one (DI infantry regiment) or two (CA infantry regiment) sections composed of four patrols with two jeeps each;

Support: four or (more generally) six 120-mm mortars, whose effectiveness is closely equivalent to that of a 155-mm artillery battery, and eight 81-mm mortars;

Anti-aircraft defense: 12 to 16 20-mm drawn single-barrel guns, assigned among the companies in groups of two, to which are added light and heavy machine guns;

NBC detection and protection with special weapons groups (one per combat company).

Because they are completely motorized, they are extremely mobile and able to cover large distances by road without personnel fatigue; they are also capable of rapid deployment and regrouping.

Their vulnerability to conventional shells and NBC weapons varies from very high in the case of units totally transported by conventional all-terrain vehicles (vans and tactical trucks), to notably lower levels in the case of VAB-equipped regiments.

The Army's anti-tank combat capability is strongly boosted by the introduction of a great number of high-performance systems (second generation HOT and Milan missiles and the 89-mm LRAC will respectively

Chart 4. Motorized infantry regiment (VAB) of infantry division



Key: (A) Motorized infantry regiment. Six in number, in the process of being equipped (three each for the Eigth and 14th DI). 1200 men -- 68 VAB version VTT (1) -- 172 wheeled vehicles -- 16 Milan stations -- Four or six 120-mm mortars -- Eight 81-mm mortars -- About a dozen 20-mm automatic guns

(B) CCS -- Sections: General staff, communications, medical, CCS command -- technical services -- gasoline-ammunition supply -- administrative services -- protection

(C) Echelon command section with two 20-mm guns

(D) Anti-tank section with four Milan stations on jeeps

(E) Section of four or six drawn 120-mm mortars

(F) Reconnaissance section on jeeps

(G) Combat company

(H) Command and support section with two 81-mm mortars, two Milan stations (1 VAB), two 20-mm guns

(I) Command section with four VAB, three combat groups, five LRAC, and three FM. Transitional organization: three combat sections per company.

replace the SS-11 and ENTAC vehicles and the 73-mm LRAC). However, while the fire power of motorized regiments is excellent in close combat -- up to 300-350 m -- with nearly two weapons per combat group, the capabilities at medium range -- up to 2000 m -- are noticeably lower, and in any case inferior to those of mechanized infantry regiments, with one Milan firing station per combat section instead of two. Army corps regiments are the only ones in a definitely superior position, with nearly tree firing stations per section. The units have no longer range systems of their own.

It must be noted that none of the anti-tank weapons used by the infantry (either motorized or mechanized), can be operated from inside armored vehicles (VAB or AMX-10P). In addition, many stations are transported by vehicles which are entirely unprotected.

But the greatest concern is raised by anti-aircraft defense. This weakness, which occurs throughout the battlefield regiments, reaches even greater proportions with motorized infantry regiments. The few 20-mm guns (which moreover, have to be drawn) represent the only specialized heavy means available to the units. In the absence of a definite air superiority, this amounts to very little in view of the following factors:

Their transport vehicles are still less well protected than those of tank or mechanized regimemts;

DI's would have to cover distances which at times might be considerable, in order to rejoin the main body of French forces engaged on German territory (or in eastern France);

Located as second echelon to control a given zone, the units should be able to provide effective opposition against airborne enemy assaults.

The adoption of a mobile system trully adapted to the infantry would no doubt contribute to improving the situation.

[Jun 80 pp 33-42 Part II]

[Text] Utilization

Whether in assault, reduction of resistance, or to occupy a small or large sector, the foot soldier is always useful, and even indispensible. When all is said and done, the infantry is most effective when engaged in closed-in areas or under reduced visibility conditions.

Unlike mechanized units, the motorized infantry regiment moves in vehicles as much as possible, but even when equipped with VAB's, it fights on foot like the infantry. Its intervention therefore requires delays: 1-2 hours without displacement in offensives; from 2 hours (with summary emplacements) to 6 hours (with collective weapons emplacements) for entrenchments in defensives. It consequently has to avoid encounter combat as much as possible, particularly with mechanized forces.

Infantry regiment capabilities depend on the action: in security missions, the maximum action zone of a unit reaches some 10 km.

In offensive situations, a regiment can attack over a front that does not exceed 5 km, or control a 100 square-km zone in friendly rear areas.

In defensive situations, its zone is 5-10 km for strikes, and in the case of a defense in depth, each of its combat companies can cover a zone of 15-20 square-km.

a) as an army corps reserve infantry (RICA), capable of powerful anti-tank action, the army corps motorized infantry regiment is used to reinforce a Large armored unit, or to conduct autonomous actions.

The missions assigned to it are:

Security (reconnaissance, coverage, and so on);

Offensives (attack, reduction of resistance, zone control, participation in exploitation, and so on);

Defensives (stopping action, strikes, zone defense, unit recovery, and so on).

By its very structure it is called upon to play a primordial role in offensive situations during combat in populated or wooded areas, or to establish bridge heads in the case of forced crossings of waterways; and we are all aware of the importance of this capability in the central European theater of operations.

This is also the conformation that is best adapted to air-mobile combat. Accustomed to act in close liaison with combat helicopter regiments, which sensibly improve the speed of its intervention, its mobility, and its flexibility, the RICA will be selected above all others to seize key points in enemy rear areas, or to transport in an emergency anti-tank teams which will oppose a penetration of enemy tanks.

It is however quite evident that the means available initially (one regiment for an army corps of 3-4 divisions) will limit its intervention in time and space solely to operations that are truly profitable, because otherwise the unit runs the risk of disappearing rapidly.

b) Infantry Division Motorized Infantry Regiment

As a rule, it is assigned the same missions as the regiment assigned to the army corps; however, it has weaker anti-tank combat capabilities, and since its units are transported in vans, it is much more vulnerable to the effects of NBC weapons, air strikes, and conventional weapon fire.

Depending on circumstances, it can:

Either join armored divisions to complement their action or for specific missions suited to the terrain, at times less favorable to armored vehicles and mechanized units;

Or constitute a mobile reserve;

Or assure DOT missions (defense of sensitive points, zone control).

The derived divisions, which could become field-ready rapidly (normally in less than 48 hours), would be assigned zone protection missions, while the large units of active infantry and the units graduated from military schools would reinforce the armored divisions. However, given the distances to be covered, it is probable that the infantry divisions would play a lesser role during the first (often decisive) phases of a conflict in the case of sudden attack.

c) The Ninth DIMA has a very special nature: an overseas unit, it could participate in the defense of the national territory, or be used to compose a general reserve at the domestic theater level.

In order to be capable of fulfilling under good conditions its major mission of intervention on foreign theater operations, the Ninth DIMA is characterized by:

Constant availability;

Primitiveness, simplicity, and limited requirements of its materiel;

Large proportion of career personnel;

Extensive training in air transportation, landings, and helicopter transportation exercises;

High vulnerability due to the absence of any means of armored transportation.

Major Vehicles of the Motorized Infantry

a) The VAB

The VAB is currently part of the equipment of army corps motorized infantry regiments, and of the Eighth and 14th DI, but it is already scheduled to be the principal transportation element of the 12th and 15th DI. Eventually, about 75 percent of the active motorized units will therefore be equipped with this vehicle. The basic model is the 4-wheel drive troop transport vehicle. It weighs 12.9 t in combat-ready condition, and carries 12 men: one driver and one leader in the front section, and a group of 10 combat soldiers with their individual and collective equipment in the rear section.

The self-defense equipment consists of a CB 52 circular shield with a 7.62-mm machine gun mounted on the right side of the front roof, and operated by the group leader. Slots that can be closed with armored shutters are located in the sides (three on each side) and in the rear doors (one per door), enabling the transported personnel to conduct observations and fire their individual weapons from inside the vehicle. Using trap doors in the roof (three in the rear section), the combat group can also use its collective weapons without having to leave the vehicle. The motorized infantry will also receive other specialized versions, which differ from this model solely in their interior layouts.

Some of these are:

The Milan VAB (capacity: two Milan teams with two firing stations and 12 reserve missiles -- six-man team: one leader, one driver, two missile firers, two loaders -- firing from the ground or from the roof of the vehicle);

The PC VAB (can operate up to four radios of short, intermediate, and long range -- six-man team: two officers, one radio non-commissioned officer, two radio operators, one driver);

The mortar tractor VAB (tows a Thomson-Brandt 120-mm rifled mortar -- transports the gun squad and 70 shells -- six-man team: one driver, one gun squad leader, one aimer, one artificer, one loader, one handler);

The echelon VAB (designed to assure maintenance, service, or repairs, is equipped to transport and supply mechanics with spare parts and tools necessary to perform its mission -- 4-man team: one driver, one team leader, two mechanics);

The medical VAB (team: one nurse group leader, one driver -- transportation capacity: 10 seated wounded, or five seated and two supine, or four supine).

With the exception of the medical VAB, all the models will carry weapons identical to the VTT.

The VAB provides the motorized infantry with an exceptional strategic mobility, a road autonomy reaching 1000 km, and a maximum speed of 92 km/h; moreover, the vehicle can be transported on Transall C 160 or Hercules C 130 cargo planes. Its perfectly sealed, high resistance armor offers satisfactory protection against light infantry weapons or shell fragments, and makes it capable of circulating in contaminated zones.

Other features of the VAB are its low specific consumption (30 to 40 l per 100 km, or three times less than the tracked AMX 10 and two times less than the AMX 10 RC), the size of its useful internal volume (4.56 cubic meters in the rear area), its simplicity which makes it inexpensive, and its exceptionally silent operation and running.

And lastly, the vehicle is amphibious without requiring preparation; it can move in water at a maximum speed of 2 m/sec by means of two hydrojets with orientable deflectors.

It should be noted that from its beginnings, the VAB was not intended for combat action in the same way as the AMX 10 P; for this reason, its carrying capacity, road mobility, and purchase and operating costs take precedence over the power of its armament, mobility in difficult terrain, or protection. This is regretable, because the French Army could have significantly increased its combat potential at very low cost; it would only have had to:

Improve the ballistic protection of the sides and especially of the front section of the vehicle;

Install a more powerful armament in a turret, capable of engaging land or air objectives under better conditions;

Adopt the 6x6 model (obtained simply by installing a third rolling axle) in order to improve its capabilities in rough terrain;

Install an engine capable of delivering a specific power equal to at least 20 HP/t;

Lower the roof height of the body by 15 to 20 cm to further reduce its vulnerability.

While it is now difficult to change the appearance of the vehicle, it would be very easy to remodel the VTT and the VAB PC by increasing their fire power (at least with the single seat Toucan 1 turret) by installing a central wheel axle, and by eventually equipping them with a new engine. This model already exists in the form of the VABE VCI 6x6.

b) The Simca-Marmon Tactical VAN

Together with the VAB, the all-terrain Simca-Marmon VAN delivered between 1964 and 1974 is one the basic vehicles used to transport combat groups of the motorized infantry. Eventually, when all the units will have received the scheduled VAB's, it will be used mainly by the Ninth DIMA and reserve DI's.

It weighs 5 tons loaded, transports 12 fully equipped men or a useful load of 1.5 tons at a maximum speed of 80 km/h (60 km/h average) over distances of 500 km (130 l gas tank), climbs grades of 60 percent, and fords depths of 1.20 m.

It offers no protection against conventional weapons and NBC agents.

Chart 5. 27th Alpine Division



Key:
(A) Alpine Division. 8800 men, 10 helicopters, 24 HM2 105-mm guns, 18 120-mm mortars, 36 81-mm mortars, 36 Milan stations, 46 89-mm LRAC, 62 AML, 38 tracked vehicles for snowed-in terrain, 1630 various road vehicles
(B) Headquarters company
(C) Communications company
(D) Transportation company
(E) Medical company
(F) ALAT squadron. Two Alouettes III, seven Alouettes II
(G) Infantry corps. Five BCA (Sixth, Seventh, 11th, 13th, and 27th) and the 159th RIA. The detailed composition is given below.
(H) Artillery company of six drawn HM2 105-mm howitzers. The HM2 howitzer will be replaced by drawn 155-mm guns or 120-mm mortars.
(I) Engineers company, with one support section and three motorized combat sections.

The 27th Alpine Division

The 27th Alpine Division, headquartered in Grenoble, covers the mountainous regions of Southeast France.

Created on 1 August 1976, this new large unit regroups the major forces of the 17th and 27th Alpine Brigades. It is divided into two semi-brigades -- the Fifth and the Seventh -- whose role is essentially operational. The 27th DA is organized as shown in chart 5.

The alpine infantry corps actually have no specific structures.

As in the case of DI units, they include:

One command and services company;

One scouting and support company with reconnaisance, information, mortar (81-mm and 120-mm), and anti-tank Milan missile sections;;

Four combat companies with one command and four combat sections each.

The armament and most of the vehicles are also identical to those of motorized infantry regiments.

They are however different from the latter by their light weight and simplicity, as well as by fewer available means, resulting from the specific combat conditions in mountainous areas. Whereas a motorized infantry regiment includes 1200 men and 240 vehicles, an alpine corps consists of only 920 men and 130 vehicles. In addition, it has some very specialized materiel (clothing, rock climbing and ski, camping, and rescue equipment).

Since the terrain most often limits tank action solely in valleys, an alpine corps has very few anti-tank weapons.

The alpine unit has a reduced fire power and poor mobility in the mountains as well as in the flatlands.

The location, training, and specific equipment of the 27th DA is designed particularly for combat in difficult terrain and in cold weather.

But this specialization is not exclusive since alpine units could operate in different regions, in collaboration or not with the other formations of a battle formation, as long as they are reinforced by means of transportation (vehicles or helicopters) and if needed by anti-tank systems.

One may well ask whether the existence of such specialized units is really justified today. No potential enemy any longer directly threatens our mountain borders. But will this always be true?

Chart 6. 11th Parachutist Division



Key: (A) 11th Parachutist Division. 12,600 men -- over 2000 road vehicles -- 20 AML (eventually 40) -- 18 120-mm mortars -- 56 81-mm mortars -- 51 20-mm guns -- 105 Milan stations -- 535 89-mm LRAC
(B) Command and communications regiment
(C) BOMAR -- Airborne mobile operational base
(D) Scouting and investigation squadron
(E) Artillery battery, six 120-mm mortars each
(F) Support company

(G) Reconnaissance squadron. At present: two on jeeps, one on AML. Eventually: one on jeep, two on AML. Six 20-mm automatic guns
(H) Combat company. Division engineers.
(I) Combat company. One command section, four combat sections
(J) First Brigade
(K) Second Brigade
(L) 425th BPCS. Command communications, transportation, repairs, and medical units.
(M) Same composition as the First RPIMa.

The use of nuclear and chemical weapons, and the resources offered by vertical maneuvers open new tactical possibilities (we must not forget that the Russians are now acquiring in Afghanistan a solid experience in mountain combat).

Moreover, France could be called upon to send troops into countries whose terrain lends itself to the use of mountain units, such as Switzerland, Italy, Norway, and Austria.

And finally, it is appropriate to point out, and history has proven it, that the hard schooling of the mountains provides fighting men who are strong both physically and morally.

Major Vehicles of the Alpine Infantry

There are no specific road vehicles for the mountain troops. The alpine infantry uses the same materiel as the other infantry units, such as jeeps, vans, and tactical trucks.

Only a few (a total of 38 for the division) tracked snow vehicles of the Flextrac-Nodwell FN 22L type are used to transport personnel and materiel over snowed-in terrain, or to draw the 105-mm HM2 gun or the 120-mm mortar mounted on skis.

This vehicle weighs 2800 kg empty and ready to move. It carries two men in the cab and one ton of material, or eight equipped men in the rear compartment; its light weight distribution (0.06 kg per square-cm when loaded) gives it good performance, enabling it in particular to climb slopes of 50-80 percent depending on the quality of the snow.

The 11th Parachute Division

The 11th Parachute Division is the major element of the French land intervention force. With its 126,000 men it is also the largest division of the Army, and the only one to have retained the brigade echelon.

Its regiments can engage in airborne, regimental, brigade, or even division operations, as well as in commando actions limited to small units and even to several men.

The essential mission of the 11th DP is of course foreign intervention, but the division can equally well become engaged on the European theater as part of the battle corps, and in the operational defense of the territory. It is consequently the polyvalent element of the French Army.

It remains to be seen whether the 11th DP has the means to accomplish under the best conditions these fundamentally different types of actions, which often entail contradictory requirements.

a) Fighting manpower: With nearly 340 combat groups of 10 men each, distributed among seven parachute infantry corps, the division has a large reserve of fighting men compared to a conventional infantry division which has less than 150 combat groups.

b) Fire support: Paratrooper units have a strong need of light and unencumbering materiel. As a result, the fire power of the 11th DP is weaker than that of most other large active formations. In practice, this means the absence of intermediate or large caliber conventional artillery, and a shift of other means of support toward higher echelons (120-mm and 80-mm mortars toward division and regimental echelons, respectively, instead of regiment and company echelons).

c) Anti-tank: An exceptional effort has been made in this domain: the 105 Milan stations for intermediate range missiles, complemented by some 500 89-mm Mle F1 LRAC, with which the division is now equipped, are well adapted to airborne troops. They provide a formidable anti-tank fire power and enables the division to effectively oppose an enemy armored penetration. In addition, the units can also depend on the support of an armed helicopter squadron.

d) Anti-aircraft: it depends essentially on 20-mm single-barrel drawn guns, whose number is actually quite low and which are totally unsuitable for airborne troops. The division should have a light and efficient weapon which could be utilized at the lowest echelons.

e) Mobility: The 11th DP has two forms of mobility which depend on the means of transportation that it uses, and which are specific to it: air mobility and ground mobility, the latter largely determined by the former.

The first is provided by helicopters and especially by transport planes. It depends primarily on the means available to the Air Force and ALAT; as we will show later, these means are very inadequate for existing needs.

On the ground, the assigned vehicles provide only partial motorization for the units. For instance, the paratrooper infantry regiment has 150 road vehicles -- nearly 50 percent of them light vehicles -- for 1200 men, or one vehicle per eight men, while the motorized regiments have 240 of them for the same number of men, or one vehicle per five men.

f) Protection: Mobility, dissemination on the ground, discretion, and good combat experience offer the best protection for airborne units, whose lightness requirements once more prevent them from having their own armored transportation vehicles.

g) Individual weapons: Replacement of the old 4256 and PM MAT49 rifles is simply a matter of time. With the FAMAS 5.56 assault rifle, the fighting men will soon be equipped with a modern individual weapon on a par with the best foreign models. It will also improve capabilities for close range anti-tank fighting, since these rifles will all be fitted with grenade launchers.

Foreign intervention usually requires lightweight means which must be rapidly transported, at times over great distances. It implies the utilization of two essential elements: fighting units and means of transportation.

Because of its training, equipment, and permanent operational readiness, the 11th DP is particularly well suited for actions of this type.

On the other hand, COTAM (Military Air Transport Command), which is responsible for transporting paratrooper units, does not have adequate means for rapid and distant intervention requiring a minimum of ground power and mobility.

In this respect, the Kolwesi operation, as a typical example of foreign action, shows the limitations of the French Intervention Forces. Observations on this operation concern both the capability for long distance transportation, and routing delays.

In terms of transportation, COTAM proved unable to immediately transport all the combat elements of a single paratrooper regiment, with its vehicles and heavy echelon over the 6000 km between Corsica and Kinshasa.

In order to meet these needs it was necessary to resort to:

Long range civilian planes which assisted military planes of the same type for personnel transport;

American aircraft available without delay and of higher performance than the Transall, to transport heavy equipment (leaving Corsica with their 16 ton maximum load, the Transalls would not have reached beyond North Africa or West Libya).

As for delays, we note that:

In order to reach its embarkation point, the Second REP had to travel for five hours over mountain roads;

Arrivals in Kinshasa were staggered between 2330 hours on 18 May, and 0830 hours on 29 May, a far cry from the airlifts we have come to expect from the Americans and the Soviets.

If engaged on the European theater as part of the First Army against an armored or mechanized enemy, the 11th DP would have to conduct predominantly anti-tank or commando type actions against the enemy's rear lines.

This much more intense type of combat requires good fire power, notably anti-tank, and excellent mobility.

While the short and intermediate range anti-tank fighting capability appears to be relatively appropriate, this is not the case for other means. Paratrooper units should be strengthened with heavy fire support, anti-aircraft weapons, and especially air transport (tactical transport planes and maneuver helicopters) as well as ground transport means (vans, trucks, or armored vehicles). But these would not always be available in sufficient numbers where and when needed.

And finally, paratrooper units would find optimum operating conditions in all closed-in areas (forested and populated areas, and rough terrain) since they are highly vulnerable to conventional or NBC fire.

In operational missions of territorial defense, the 11th DP would oppose attempts to penetrate land and sea borders as well as air penetration tentatives.

Under these circumstances and except for massive attacks, the light combat and search elements endowed with high mobility (helicopters, vehicles) would generally be the most effective ones.

Given their manpower, structure, and quality, paratrooper units would certainly obtain excellent results in case of engagements, but once more, they would have to be reinforced with means of transportation.

Moreover, it is our opinion that they would be under-used in the case of security missions.

Major Vehicles of the Paratrooper Infantry

Airborne status requires possession of the lightest equipment possible. However, with the exception of the Fardier LOHR FL500, mass produced since 1978, airborne troops utilize the same road vehicles -- jeeps, vans, and trucks -- as motorised infantry units.

The FL 500 is a type of low-wheeled small jeep designed to reduce the burden of airborne troops after landing.

It is compact (2.41 m long, 1.50 m wide, and 1.37 m high), light (620 kg empty and 1100 kg loaded), and readily transportable by air:

Aboard Transall C160 planes: air drop of six vehicles with associated loads or weapons, or air transportation of 10 vehicles with associated loads of 600 kg each.

Aboard Puma SA 330 helicopters: transportation of two FL 500's with associated loads, or one vehicle with ammunition and one 120-mm mortar.

The vehicle can transport heavy weapons with their ammunition (notably the Milan firing station with eight reserve missiles), all types of supplies, equipped personnel, and stretcher cases. Over short distances at reduced speed, it can also haul the 120-mm rifled mortar (maximum towing load of 500 kg).

It has a maximum road speed of 44 km/h, and a self-sufficient range of 200 km by road or eight hours cross-country.

An all-terrain vehicle thanks to its 4-wheel drive, it can climb 50 percent grades, 30 percent banks, and ford depths of 0.40 m.

Simple in design, it is built from standard Citroen parts used on the Mehari:

29 HP (3 taxable HP) AR2 gas engine running at 6750 rpm;
Synchronized gearbox with four forward speeds and one reverse;
Swing-arm suspension with lateral interaction, coil springs, and four track-type reinforced hydraulic shock absorbers.

In short, the FL 500 is well adapted for airborne troops. We regret only that the size of the current order (only 280 vehicles so far) is so limited; by comparison, the German airborne division has received over 700 similar vehicles, Kraka type*, for no more than 8000-9000 men.

Is the French Infantry Really Ready for the Present Threat?

In order to determine the means best suited for an army, some essential factors must be taken into account:

1) Site of intervention and nature of terrain: in all probability the French Army would have to intervene on FRG territory. Because of its physical character and especially its characteristic high urban density,

* The Kraka is heavier (785 kg empty) and of higher performance (useful load of 875 kg; maximum speed of 55 km/h) than the FL 500; it is also bulkier (2.780 m long). It has the interesting feature of being foldable (length can be reduced to 1.850 m), which makes it possible to transport it by air in greater numbers (14 instead of 10 by Transall).

this country offers good infantry intervention possibilities. On the other hand, it lacks depth and therefore makes it difficult to mount an elastic defense. In addition, its very widespread eastern borders are virtually devoid of any natural protection, while they offer many important lines of penetration.

2) Potential enemy: today's potential enemy for France and its allies are the Warsaw pact members. They have exceptionally powerful armored forces: no less than 20,500 tanks and about 30,000 assorted armored vehicles (light tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, VCI, VTT, self-propelled ground-to-ground and ground-to-air artillery weapons), half of which are of Soviet origin, permanently stationed in RDA, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Their air action capability has also increased considerably in recent years, and the organization is well tested as demonstrated by the events in Afghanistan. Finally, it is very well supplied with chemical projectiles.

On the other hand, their means of communication and logistics seem more meager than those of the western side, and their conventional fire support materiel (guns, cannons) are fairly vulnerable to conventional or NBC fire (although this vulnerability tends to lessen with the introduction of new self-propelled artillery pieces). In addition, the West still has a theoretical, slight advantage in sophisticated materiel relying on the latest technologies.

It is generally agreed today that conflict could break out in Europe without benefit of sufficient forewarning to mobilize or even deploy. Initially, active units would be alone or nearly alone in bearing the burden of enemy attack. Since the personnel is necessarily limited, the point is to properly arm, organize, and train forces in terms of the major threat.

For the West, this means primarily the availability of a strong anti-tank battle capability.

For the infantry more specifically, its basic combat unit should have three major resources:

A light anti-tank weapon capable of engaging all current armored vehicles up to intermediate ranges;

A light transport and combat armored vehicle equipped with a heavy weapon turret;

A night or poor visibility sighting and firing system.

The anti-tank weapon exists in the form of Milan: this system gives excellent results up to 2000 m against practically all current ground objectives (according to American statements concerning the fire resistance of the new Soviet tanks, Milan's effectiveness in head-on fire remains to be demonstrated; but there is no doubt that it can always neutralize the tank

at other angles of fire). However, it would be desirable for it to be usable equally well on the ground (firing station) as sheltered in a vehicle (turret), depending on specific tactical conditions or in order to take advantage of rough terrain.

The vehicle should be light, nimble, simple, unobtrusive, and compact (maximum dimensions: 4.2 m long, 2.2 m wide, and 1.8 m high without turret); it should be inexpensive to buy and operate, well armed against air and ground objectives (turret equipped with 25 to 30-mm gun, one or two Milan missile launchers, and one firing station usable on the ground with four or five reserve missiles); it should be equipped with adequate protection against small caliber projectiles (at least 14.5-mm head-on and 7.62 mm on the sides) and shell fragments. In terms of initial needs, a team of seven or eight men (including Milan operators and driver) would be sufficient to conduct missions under good conditions, because in case of attacks without warning, the attackers would also have relatively limited forces, and in other cases the reserve units would bring reinforcements to the active units.

Passive systems for sighting and firing at night or under poor visibility conditions, based on thermography principles, will soon be available. This will give the infantry extremely important round-the-clock intervention capabilities, since it must be remembered that the Soviets prefer night operations and that they advocate intensive use of smoke materiel when faced with unavoidable or unalterable anti-tank positions.

Units equipped in this manner would have great flexibility of action: their best approaches would be infiltration in order to attack the flanks and rear of moving enemy columns, or strikes making maximum use of terrain characteristics. Their role would be to prepare and facilitate armored division engagements by slowing the enemy and weakening him as much as possible.

In summary, despite obvious progress made during recent years in modernizing the infantry, the latter must still acquire greater mobility, protection, and fire power if it wants to regain its primordial role in battle.

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NATION'S AIR INTERVENTION CAPABILITY OUTLINED

Paris REVUE AFRICAINE DE STRATEGIE in French Apr-Jun 80 pp 51-53

[Article: "The Aerial Means of French Military Interventions"]

[Text] France is strengthening and developing its intervention forces, officially rebaptized "Forces of external action." To the 11th Parachute Division, the 9th Division of Marine Infantry, the 1st Foreign Legion Cavalry Regiment, and the Marine Commandos, which are already included in the forces, will be added, as of the month of August, 1980, a new component: the 31st Demi-Brigade. This unit will have a strength of 2,000 men, will include a regiment of Marine infantry--the 21 Regiment of Marine Infantry--and a regiment of inter-service armored vehicles equipped with AMX 10 RC tanks, VAB Renault armored cars, and a battery of 155 mm artillery. The total strength of the "Forces of external action" will be increased to 28,000 men.

The military program law for the years 1977-1982 defines the missions of external intervention as follows: "Outside Europe the armed forces must be in a position to contribute to the security of the countries with which France is allied by agreement or by solidarity in fact, economic or cultural." It is quite evident that the majority of the countries so defined are African.

The examples of Mauritania, Chad, Lebanon, Kolwezi, Central Africa, and Tunisia illustrate this attitude. France has been provided with assets for intervention several thousand kilometers from her own territory. And new techniques of aerial navigation and refueling in flight have been integrated into and mastered by the French air force, which is to be the vector and source of support of these interventions.

French Pilots Trained for Long-Distance Interventions: Inertial Navigation and Refueling in Flight

Inspired by the techniques used on Mirage IV bombers, which carry nuclear weapons, and on Mirage F III penetration aircraft of the tactical air

forces, inertial navigation equipment has been developed by the CIET (Training Center for Equipment and Transport) at the Toulouse-Francazal base and by 61st Transport Squadron in Orleans. It involves the principle of the cruise missile, without the automation.

The Transall aircraft has Doppler radar equipment associated with a computer and a weather and navigation radar. The system requires an enormous amount of preparatory work. In practice the flight should be undertaken once in advance, under normal conditions. In the course of this preparatory flight, reports of position are noted, and the radar scope is photographed about every five minutes. A computation grill is also prepared which will later permit the navigator to determine deviations from the overhead photograph in terms of the course to be followed enroute and, therefore, to make corrections to permit redirection of the plane.

Inertial navigation requires the precision of a metronome. It must make it possible, in effect, to follow a course with the time of arrival given, at a given speed, at an altitude ranging from 50 to 300 m above all obstacles, ranging up to 9 km to one side or the other of the basic route and looking 4 km ahead and behind the position of the aircraft. Arrival over the objective must be very precise, since the purpose is to undertake a drop in conditions of no visibility or an assault landing on an open field with or without a radar beacon.

Advantage: to Fly in All Weather Conditions Without Being Noticed

Surface to air or air to air missiles considerably reduce the freedom of action of air transport aircraft. In a hostile area or in a safe area it is necessary not to be lured into risks on one's own. Transport aircraft are sufficiently large and slow to be picked up by lookout systems and even with the naked eye in clear weather. Regarding their infra-red radiation, it is enough to attract missiles. Tactical cargo aircraft like the Transalls cannot escape with their own speed (500 km per hour, maximum). They do not have either an infra-red, electromagnetic threat detector nor a decoy likely to deceive the enemy. However, they are not necessarily powerless victims.

It is like a parade: flight at tree level, exploiting as much as possible the natural camouflage provided by topography and the nature of the ground. The aircraft fits in with the terrain and blends in with nature. Thanks to blind flying it uses the camouflage of the clouds or of the night to arrive in radio silence and in radar silence (electromagnetic discretion) over its objective. This makes it possible to preserve surprise.

This technique is fully developed and is presently being used by COTAM (Military Air Transport Command). Under operational conditions it permits the dropping of parachutists at 150 m of altitude, in circumstances of no visibility. This is the lowest altitude permitted for the parachutes of

airborn troops. The technique permits an assault landing on an open field on any natural surface about 800 m long. The flight can be conducted at an altitude of 50 m from the ground.

Adaptation to Any Zone of Operations

Originally conceived of to be used in Europe, the Transall aircraft has become the designated medium for French interventions in Africa (Mauritania, Zaire, Chad, and recently the provision of logistical aid to Tunisia).

The method of inertial navigation can equally be employed in this aircraft. And even if it is difficult to go and take reconnaissance photos of a route over certain territory, the difficulty can be overcome. It is enough to photograph the radar echoes obtained from above a model which reproduces the relief features of the ground over the route to be followed. Good relief maps and good model makers therefore make up the team.

Regarding the Transall C160, whose pilots in the French Air Force say themselves that it has "legs that are rather short," this defect will soon be corrected. At present the COTAM has 44 Transall aircraft, of which five are permanently based overseas. They can carry 15 tons (fully loaded) over a distance of 1,000 km, for example, an AMX 13 tank, or eight tons over a distance of 4,500 km, or about 80 men and their personal arms and equipment. After 1982 France will be equipped with 25 to 28 Transall's which can be refueled in flight, which will make it possible to double their radius of action and will bring within their range all points on the African continent.

Assault Landing

We have been gone from the air base at Villacoublay, near Paris, for an hour and 45 minutes. We emerge over a desert plateau where grass and gravel provide the cover. A plateau surrounded by small mountains, round in form, not far from Toulouse. Altitude: 50 m above the ground. Under our wings flocks of sheep run in fear. Suddenly, this Transall points its nose down, as if it were going to crash. Then it noses up, and the pilot brings the aircraft down to the ground. We grip the tubular arm rests of the seats. The aircraft bounces, turns, bounces again. Motors howling, propellers reversed. Everything happens very rapidly, the aircraft is stopped, we go out on the inclined plane of the rear loading door, which has already been lowered. Above, at an altitude of 150 m, the second Transall on the raid is dropping its parachutists, a Jeep, and a mortar.

Refuelling in Flight and Operations Abroad

At an altitude of 8,500 m and a speed of 850 km per hour, the spectacle which develops at the after end of the C135 tanker aircraft is fascinating. The "boomer," the officer charged with refuelling and control of the

operation, is stretched out on his couch before an instrument panel. This was the kind of position used by a bombardier in the Superfortresses of World War II. Through a wide porthole before him a veritable ballet is developing, as in slow motion. A ballet where the least error can cause a death. A Mirage IV of the French strategic air forces is there, 10 m from the tail assembly of the Boeing 707, with two Mirage F1's and two Jaguar's flying cover. Under its belly, a nuclear bomb. In the light of the setting sun, somewhere above the Mediterranean, its outer skin, like a supersonic and mortal bird of prey, is colored in dark gold. The pilot, whose facial features can be distinguished under his helmet, is working his controls. No useless movements: "One meter, 50 centimeters, contact." The voice of the "boomer" resounds in my helmet: "Contact." The pole which extends from the nose of the Mirage IV has just penetrated into the "bread-basket" which trails at the end of the refueling boom. The diameter of the basket is 30 cm. "Beginning of transfer." In the fuselage of the C135 we are all equipped with a parachute, a "Mae West," and a helmet, with an oxygen mask covering our noses. These are the security rules. In effect, an accident--collision in flight, breaking off of the refueling pole, explosion--is always possible.

The time required to "pump" its kerosene at the rate of 1,400 liters per minute, and the weight of the Mirage IV let it slide by while losing a little altitude. End of the refueling operation. An F1 replaces the Mirage.

Just two or three minutes are enough to refuel a Mirage or a Jaguar in good meteorological conditions. But that is not always the case. There are conditions of turbulence which shake the aircraft, which pull out the refueling pole, sending a splash of fuel over the cockpit. At night, there may be ice crystals in the lamplight which limit visibility.

The technique of rendezvous in flight must also be ceaselessly practiced. Over French territory the technique of guidance by air defense radars is used. But overseas it is necessary to decide on a geographic point at a given time. Everything depends on the mathematics of the affair and a waiting orbit, often in the form of an elongate racetrack.

Refueling Breaks the Constraints

A Mirage IV can fly 7,000 km with one refueling. "It is enough to lay out the distances on a map to see immediately all the points which we can reach with one stretch of the wings," explains General Saulnier, commander of the strategic air forces.

"Moreover, refueling, by increasing the range, permits us to swing wide of and between enemy defenses, missile batteries, and other threats. And that applies, of course, over Europe as over Africa. In the context of internationsl tension which we are living through at present the French striking force is keeping all its dissuasive value," General Saulnier continued.

There are no cases where the most pessimistic studies have shown that less than five percent of the aircraft of an attacking wave would reach their objectives. That is enough to make the enemy think. The jet aircraft carrying a nuclear bomb is not an outmoded solution at the moment to the extent that the Americans are providing new motors for their B52 strategic bombers and the Soviets are developing their Backfire's.

The Raid on Djibouti

Mastery of aerial refueling and the possibilities for intervention and for support which it offers were perfectly illustrated last 29 January: six Mirage F1, from the 5th fighter squadron from Orange, assembled at the air base at Sclenzara in Corsica and then went on to Djibouti in less than 6 hours. The Jaguar, a ground attack aircraft, has also made a non-stop flight from France to Abidjan. And, in the course of assistance operations in Mauritania, refueling in flight permitted aircraft to remain longer in flight over their objectives.

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COMMENTARY ON UDF DEFENSE POLICY, 1981 BUDGET PROPOSAL

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Jean-Marie Daillet, member of parliament from the Department of Manche, vice chairman of the national defense committee, and chairman of the UDF [Union for French Democracy] defense committee: "What Kind of Defense Budget for 1981?"]

> [Text] Defense issues will long remain very much in the news now that the Western powers have launched a new arms modernization program designed to counter mounting Soviet power. In the following article, Jean-Marie Daillet reviews the conclusions of the UDF report on defense and expresses delight at noting that in France there is a broad consensus on the major defense options.

French public opinion has certainly come a long way since Alexandre Sanguinetti chose to drop his journalistic "bomb" during the midsummer doldrums of 1979. We may not have agreed very much with some of his proposals, and yet we were grateful to him for having had the courage to jolt some inordinately entrenched dogmas with his provocative heretical comments.

His analysis of the threat was exceptionally clear-sighted. And although his conclusions were quite partial and extremist--how could anyone suggest that the FRG withdraw from NATO, and not be deemed unrealistic?--the main thrust of his argument had the merit--unexpected and especially substantial, coming as it did, from a nationalist--of disputing the tranquilizing myth of a neutralist and isolated national defense policy which restricts solely to France proper a strictly nuclear deterrence of the "all-or-nothing" type.

This was in no way the policy implemented by Giscard d'Estaing or his predecessors. Giscard's famous policy statement of 1976 had merely drawn the first inferences from changes which had occurred since the beginnings of France's nuclear weapons program, changes in technology as well as in international relations. Nevertheless, there were some persons who tried to lock national defense policy into outmoded or abstract postures, and attempted to impose their astonishingly narrow view of ways and means of providing for our country's security, a country they considered as isolated

and as if it had never been, in complete independence, an ally unfailingly faithful, in crisis situations, to its obligations toward the other free nations bound by the Brussels Treaty and the Washington [North Atlantic] Treaty. This incredibly doctrinaire and Maginot Line kind of viewpoint strove to assert itself, and, in actual fact, it dominated the thinking of a number of persons through a sort of theological orthodoxy, indeed even intellectual terrorism, despite the obvious fact that no chief of state in the Fifth Republic, and particularly its illustrious founder, had ever failed to abide by that solidarity which the Alliance implies.

It is true that Atlantic resolve had slackened somewhat with the passing years. Instead of prompting the United States to redouble its vigilance, the end of the Vietnam War was driving that country into unilateral disarmament and acceptance of the Soviet Union's explanation of detente. Even Soviet progress in the destabilization of Africa and the deployment of the Russian fleet did not stop Kissinger and Nixon--who now have the effrontery to criticize Carter--from constantly reducing defense budgets. SALT was the major idea of that two-man rule.

It took the invasion of Afghanistan to put an end to this delusion. And America is now discovering that it has lowered its guard for so long that it will take 2 to 3 years to rebuild a defense industry capable of reequipping its currently sparse military manpower, not to mention the increased personnel strength its armed forces would obtain through the draft, if the latter is ever approved by Congress.... As for the most faithful Atlanticists take Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Canada, a person need only have attended the North Atlantic Assembly's annual conference and heard their parliamentarians beseech the United States to ratify SALT II, to understand how little these countries actually care about increasing their respective national contributions to the common security. In the interval between last October's meeting in Ottawa and the meeting in Luxembourg on 7 June this year, "the Kabul effect" did dispel many illusions, but still not enough of them to get all of these parliamentarians to approve--as the French delegation did, all political parties* concurring--current American decisions on the deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe, the strategic mobile launcher [MX] program, the reinforcement of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, etc.

France's Atlantic partners, and the United States foremost of all, are beginning to better understand wherein our policy of independent effect was more courageous and more realistic than the policy of the nations that

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*UDF, PS [Socialist Party], and RPR [Rally for the Republic]. Communist parties are not represented in the North Atlantic Assembly.

are integrated into the Alliance's military organization and virtually aline themselves with all of Washington's decisions, good or bad.

Considerable Authority

There is no doubt whatever that Giscard d'Estaing has gained considerable authority within the Alliance as a result of the originality and determination of France's national policy, the steady increase in its defense budget since 1976, and even more because of its evident resolve to oppose Soviet imperialism in Africa. The Kolwezi [Zaire] operation has now become the symbol of that resolve, even though this intervention was modest in scope. What Giscard d'Estaing said, at his 26 June press conference, about continued modernization and diversification of our nuclear forces--the enhanced-radiation weapon--and conventional forces, must definitely have enlightened our partners. The latter can also clearly see that, at the same time, the president of the French Republic is persistently pursuing a coherent policy of reducing tensions in the world, a policy of economic solidarity and of strengthening the European Community.

In its report, "A Defense Doctrine for France," the UDF made, in complete independence, an analysis that endeavored--as required by the subject matter --to be more objective than partisan. This is no doubt why the report's proposals created much less controversy--except, naturally, from the communists--than inveterate aficionados of political news and incidents expected. We are delighted to note that, on the contrary, while our initiative has greatly added fresh fuel to the debate, the latter has developed to date in an atmosphere in which a sense of national and European interest has prevailed over partisan feelings. Save some legitimate differences, this discussion bears not on the analysis of the threat, not on the need to cope with it, and not even on the intensity of the effort France must make to prepare itself to meet that threat. Instead the issues being debated have to do with where and when French forces should intervene and also with the relative importance and size of the various defense forces, weapons, and equipment.

We do not wish to minimize the scope of the subsisting differences of opinion on these last two points, but we must say that initial results of the dialog now getting underway on these complex matters are already quite positive.

Prompted--alas!--by events outside of France, Frenchmen, and particularly those persons highly active in French political life (with the sole exception of communist leaders), are reaching a consensus on the major principles upon which to base the most effective and most deterring defense policy possible.

Everything must prompt the government to speed up our defense budget's rate of growth by 1981. Taking into consideration the socioeconomic difficulties ahead, it is not excessive, in our opinion, to consider 4 percent of GNP the percentage Frenchmen should allocate to their armed forces by 1982,

i.e. in 2 years. This represents a 20 percent increase over the current defense budget, or some 20 billion francs in constant francs. In the event the government were to find this sum excessive from the standpoint of the tax burden Frenchmen can bear in a period of inflation and social difficulties, we wonder, in that case, why the idea of a loan should be ruled out.

The peace, security, and independence of our country and the free world demand, in any case, that each partner in the Alliance decide as soon as possible to make a vigorous preventive effort. Liberty is never so costly as when we have denied ourselves the means of having it command respect.

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SOVIET SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE VIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Jul 80 p 6

[Text] The Soviet arsenal has reached a size and quality compatible neither with the Western nations' expectations of a "policy of detente" nor with the ever more popular hypothesis that there is an "approximate balance" between East and West. At a recently held session of the "Foundation for Science and Politics," financed by the FRG government, between German, American, French and English experts, Philipp Karber, American researcher and former Pentagon worker, presented a research paper whose accuracy was not doubted by any of the experts present. The figures he used were the same which had been at the disposal of the Western delegates in the Vienna force reduction negotiations.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union in Central Europe (an area covering the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia) does not have more divisions or soldiers than it did 12 years ago, but has at its disposal considerably more and better arms than the Western allies in Western Europe have at present or will have in the foreseeable future. There is a threat that the 1980's will become a time of considerable foreign policy risks for Western security in every important military respect--the strategic-nuclear, the regional European and the political, regarding the import of raw materials.

In the European central section, as defined in the Vienna MBFR negotiations (the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the one side, the FRG and the Benelux countries on the other), there has been a considerable Soviet superiority in terms of soldiers, tanks, artillery and lately also planes since the end of World War II. But in important areas, e.g., planes and tactical nuclear weapons, NATO made a large part of its quantitative inferiority tolerable with the quality of individual weapons categories. The imbalance was thus compensated for.

But today, the Soviet Army and the other forces under Soviet control in Central Europe have at their disposal many weapons systems equal in quality to ours, and some even superior. This entire extraordinarily rapid increase and consistent improvement in Eastern superiority has occurred especially since 1968. Politically, this was also the age of the "policy of detente"

and arms control negotiations. The Soviet armament policy seems to have remained totally unaffected by this.

According to Karber, the physical security of Western Europe appears to be even less assured today than it was during the Berlin blockade, the Prague putch and the Korean war, which led to the foundation of the Western Alliance in 1948/49. Because then, according to Karber, the Soviet troops in the GDR--22 divisions then, as opposed to 19 now--were largely cadre units which were not combat ready and not complete, whereas the Western nations in Europe, although weak on land, were in full control of air and seas and held a nuclear monopoly, and the United States had an undisputed economic and technical-scientific superiority and freedom of action.

In the 12 years between 1968 and 1980, the number of Eastern tanks in Central Europe has risen from 12,900 to 18,000 (NATO: from 5,635 to 6,200), the number of armored vehicles from 13,400 to 18,000 (NATO: from 12,300 to 14,400), the number of artillery from 4,600 to 6,500 (NATO: from 1,900 to 2,300) antiaircraft weapons from 4,400 to 5,000 (NATO: from 1,750 to 2,300), tactical combat planes from 2,900 to 3,200 (NATO: sank from 1,600 to 1,420).

The Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in tanks has increased from 2.3 : 1 in 1968 to 3 : 1 in 1980. To a significant degree, this involves the latest, fourth technical generation tank on the Eastern side. The Soviet Union now has 10 times more tanks of this advanced series (T 64 and T 72) than the West. This new generation of tank is marked by a heavy caliber canon (120 mm or more) and a new type armor consisting of several layers of steel and ceramics which apparently cannot be pierced by any antitank weapon extant. On the Western side, the Leopard II and the new American XM-1 (which does not have the heavy canon) belong to this fourth generation. Even now, the Soviet Union has more new tanks of this type stationed in Central Europe than the West could build until 1985; the Soviet Union started production 2 years before the West did.

When comparing the other armored vehicles, the difference between East and West does not seem especially great. But it is much stronger when it comes to technical quality. The Soviet APC's are absolute combat vehicles. On the Western side, on the other hand, three-fourths of the vehicles are merely protected vehicles used to transport infantry who must leave the vehicle in combat.

A dual, quantitative and qualitative evaluation must also be made as far as the Eastern Bloc's artillery superiority in Central Europe is concerned. The Western countries introduced medium, self-propelled artillery as early as the 1960's, thus compensating for their smaller number with a gain in mobility. In the meantime, the Soviet Union has changed almost its entire light artillery to medium caliber, as well as much of its towed artillery to self-propelled artillery. Now these canons can advance together with the tanks and engage the enemy's antitank weapons. The new Soviet artillery is technically equal to Western guns, and individual weapons systems even

surpass those of the West. The quantitative superiority in tubes of nearly 3 to 1 thus becomes significant. Karber is especially impressed by the number of Soviet rocket launchers, 40 tubes on each truck. A single batallion (18 launchers) can concentrate as much fire over a certain area with one round as the artillery of an entire Western Army corps. Only the West German army has such a weapons system, but only in small numbers.

There is a fatal disproportion in antiaircraft and antitank systems, to which NATO, in its defensive role, should have assigned the greatest priority: The West has essentially fewer antitank weapons than the East has tanks and APC's (5,000 antitank systems opposed to 36,000 armored vehicles, a ratio of 1 to 7.2). And the Eastern alliance in Central Europe has at its disposal more defensive weapons than the West, although the number of Western armored vehicles is considerably smaller (7,400 antitank weapons to 20,600 armored vehicles, a ratio of 1 to 2.8). These figures also indicate a more than twofold relative superiority of the East.

With the tactical air forces it is similar: The West always has been and remains far inferior numerically. Its qualitative advantage was significant. It is largely lost now. A comparison of antiaircraft capabilities between both sides shows that the Warsaw Pact has at its disposal more than three times more antiaircraft weapons than the number of aircraft NATO has, and that NATO has fewer antiaircraft weapons than the enemy has planes. The Soviet Union had the new radar-guided low-flying antiaircraft canon before the West did and has more of them. The Soviet Union also produced more and better weapons systems of the more efficient surface-to-air rockets than the West has. Only recently, with the German Gepard and the French-German Roland systems, the West has come up with comparable weapons, but in much smaller quantities.

The Karber report shows that the qualitative and quantitative comparison of weapons systems is far less favorable than has been generally assumed, and that it must be given far more serious consideration than the ratio of troop strength on both sides.

The West-East situation becomes even less favorable if one expands the comparison: e.g., the greater combat readiness of the units on the Eastern side in the areas West of the Soviet-Polish border and the relatively low combat readiness of the NATO ground forces in Europe. This is true not only for the smaller Western allies, but also for the larger ones, the American army in the FRG, the British Rhine army, and FRG army and the French forces. In addition, there is the disadvantage of lack of uniformity in the equipment of the Western armies compared to the uniform logistical system of the Warsaw Pact, as well as weaknesses on the Western side as far as mobilization, length of service, reserves, logistical supplies from overseas and other disadvantages in the geographic position and geographic conditions of Western Europe in an armed conflict.

NATO's inferiority in the total number of soldiers (935,000 to 772,800, difference: 162,200), which is still the subject of futile negotiations in

their eighth year (since 1972) at the Vienna MBFR negotiations, is in essence the least unfavorable detail and the least important as far as the imbalance in Central Europe is considered. Should they come to a first agreement, with much effort and also sacrifices in terms of American presence, nothing important in terms of security would be gained. The MBFR negotiations have been essentially made obsolete by political developments.

A second report, submitted by Abraham Becker of the Rand Corporation, showed that there are no signs that the Soviet armament policy has strained or will soon strain Soviet economic capacities. An investigation based on available CIA data shows that Soviet arms expenditures have had a rather steady real increase of between 3 and 5 percent year after year for the past 15 years. This constant growth was independent of any tendencies of the Western defense budget or fluctuations in Soviet economic growth rates. According to Becker, Soviet arms growth rates largely correspond to Soviet economic growth, but the defense and armament budget apparently does not depend on the economic growth. From this it must be assumed, he says, that we are dealing with long-range political decisions of the Soviet Union. According to Becker, the popular Western assumption that the Soviet Union "suffers" from its "armament burden" and seeks relief through a "policy of detente" lacks any foundation.

According to Becker's investigation, the American defense budget, based on 1970 (100 percent) fell from 118 percent in 1968 (Vietnam war) to 71 percent in 1976, and rose after that to 76 percent in 1978 (real values, with adjustments for inflation). The Soviet arms budget, the Soviet Union's military expenditures for 1970 (100 percent), rose from 95 percent in 1968, at an almost even growth rate to approximately 140 percent in 1978. It is probable that the Soviet Union will spend approximately one and one-half times as much in real values in 1980 as it did 10 years ago. There are no signs that this trend would change.

At the Foundation of Science and Politics conference, one participant made the prognosis that the Western countries could not catch up with the Soviet Union in the decade until 1900 even if they decided to double the percentage of real Soviet defense expenditures.

There are three reasons why these reports seem to be especially informative. First: The massive Soviet armament effort is continuing. Developmental tendencies are unchanged on both sides. The scissors are opening. There are no indications that the Soviet Union will reach a plateau at any time soon where it would wish to stop. Other movements also, namely, the introduction of modern weapons systems, show a steep escalation, while on the NATO side there has been a strong leveling off in many important arms categories since the 1970's. The difference between threat and defense capability gets greater every year. After 10 years, it has become amazingly big. In spite of that, explanations of leading politicians in the FRG, France and most of the smaller nations of the Western Alliance, especially si[illegible]hanistan, are aimed at calming down their own public.

The second notable point is that the Soviet Union has pushed and continues to push for this threatening development, while simultaneously courting a policy of detente and fighting for the principle of "equal security" in every communique. While the Soviet Union negotiated in Vienna about force reductions, which have the purpose of establishing a parity at least when it comes to the numerical strength of troops, and offered NATO the withdrawal of 1,700 tanks and 20,000 Russians for a reduction of its tactical nuclear weapons, Brezhnev slipped an additional 3,000 tanks into the GDR. This means that during the Vienna negotiations, the Soviet Union changed the basis for these negotiations in such a way that even after a possibly agreed upon force reduction of one armored infantry regiment, it would still have more armored troops stationed in the Warsaw Pact area than it did at the beginning of the "disarmament negotiations." Whether with or without arms control, with or without detente--the Soviet Union is arming without any visible signs of fatigue. This is taking place not only in Central Europe, but also on all other fronts of the East-West conflict, the strategic long-distance weapons, the fleet, and the potential for intervention in conflicts of the Third World, be it with weapons, be it with strike forces, be it with representative armies.

The third point is a question: Why do the Western governments continue to explain publicly year after year that the balance of power continues or that the imbalance is within an acceptable range? The Western capacity to tolerate Soviet superiority appears to grow miraculously to the same degree as Soviet superiority. In fact, the consternation of Western military and civilian experts is increasing and the efforts by the political leaderships to cover up are becoming ever balder.

Why do the Western Alliance governments act in this manner? Why do they explain away the situation? A similar conflict occurs in all governments: Cabinets request that parliaments increase the defense budget, but they do not allow the general of staff to accurately portray the situation, because they fear that public reaction will go in the wrong direction. They fear it would discourage the public and provoke the opinion that defense had become meaningless anyhow and that it is better to do the bidding of the Soviet Union. Governments believe that they must fear the alarm of their own people more than they must fear the enemy. Apparently they do not expect to be able to inspire the people to decisiveness and willingness to sacrifice. This avoidance of the requirements of a security policy is becoming more detrimental each time, from year to year. Each time it becomes a little more difficult to reveal the worsening situation.

The worry of governments about public defeatism is also connected with the fact that the Western public simply mistakes the Soviet ability to wage war against Western Europe with a Soviet intention to in fact wage war.

Recently, the Federal chancellor has himself contributed to that with obscure insinuations of an analogy between the present, after Afghanistan, and the history before World War I, and also with his urging not to let the

"dialog" with Moscow be terminated, especially now of all times, as if he were dealing with one of the Balkan crises of that time.

The first, the more probable danger threatening Europe from the growing military superpower, is not war itself, but rather possibilities of extortion and, out of fear of extortion, the danger of accommodation, of appeasement and of the surrender of Western Europe's souvereignity. The probable danger is not a war, but a power-political wearing out of the West European nations, should they some day, militarily even more inferior than at present, be totally surrounded and incapable of making a move.

The attitude of the Western European governments toward the Soviet Union after Afghanistan and toward the PLO in the Near East conflict are significant signs of a European readiness to accommodate, which may be explained by the growing imbalance of power in Europe and the Third World's inability to act. It becomes ever more difficult, but also more necessary, to break out of the vicious circle.

Comparison of Arms Strength in Central Europe During "Detente"

	1968	1980	Increase of WP by	Superiority
1. Tanks				
WP	12,900	18,000		
NATO	5,635	6,200	5,100	almost 3:1
2. Armored Vehicles				
WP	13,400	18,000		
NATO	12,300	14,400	4,600	1.25:1 [1]
3. Antitank				
WP	2,750	7,400		
NATO	3,000	5,000	4,650	2.6:1 [2]
4. Artillery				
WP	4,600	6,500		
NATO	1,900	2,300	1,900	almost 3:1
5. Antiaircraft				
WP	4,400	5,000		
NATO	1,750	2,300	600	almost 5:1 [2]
6. Tactical Aircraft				
WP	2,900	3,200		
NATO	1,600	1,420	300	2.35:1

FOOTNOTES

1. The Warsaw Pact superiority in APC's is approximately four times greater. Three-fourths of the NATO strength consists merely of armored transport vehicles.

2. Relative superiority of the Warsaw Pact after calculation of the number of defensive weapons of one side with the corresponding offensive weapons of the other side (total armored vehicles or tactical aircraft).

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ROLES OF EAST, WEST IN NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE CONTRASTED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Jul 80 p 10

[Article by Martin Gester: "Forcing the West to Its Knees in the South"]

[Text] Many people say that the central problem of the coming decades will be to mitigate the provocative differences between the industrial states and the developing countries. They say that even Moscow cannot escape from this challenge, and therefore someday it will be prepared to help the needy South in its development, possibly in joint programs with the rich West. Thus, the North-South Commission headed by Willy Brandt knocked on doors in the Kremlin in an attempt to persuade the men around Brezhnev to increase the laughably small amount of development aid from the Eastern bloc. The brush-off which they received is scarcely surprising. The political results of Western cooperation with the developing countries are not very likely to induce the socialist camp to undertake a similar commitment. Sometimes one even has the impression that the West is losing some prestige precisely because of this cooperation. Because the closer the contact with the industrial states, the more often is the West alloted the role of whipping-boy in the South.

One does not have to search long to find the reasons for this. Who drives the best cars here? Who lives in the most beautiful quarters of town? Who draws the highest salaries? Who has the most important positions in the many multinational companies? The answer is always the same: The foreigners from rich North America and from West Europe, who can afford this standard only because their peoples exploit other peoples.

Government aid is often just as annoying as private cooperation. Misunderstandings and frictions cannot be helped. Some people are indignant because the donor countries support "dangerous leftists," and others grumble because "reactionary governments" are being strengthened by these monies. Because of the well-nigh inevitable slip-ups and provocations, the "Western system" is more and more in danger of falling into disrepute. One hears that "socialism may have its questionable

aspects, but by now we are sure of one thing: The generous aid from the West serves only the West, while we in the recipient countries are getting poorer and poorer."

The "critical intelligentsia" long ago "exposed" foreign investments and development aid as concealed exploitation. Authoritarian governments are able to curb the dissemination of such fashionable discoveries for a while yet. But when the power lies with the "popular" politicians alone, there is no stopping it. Because they wish to be elected by people who are becoming more and more conscious of their misery. With their vague feeling of protest, the have-nots at last give their votes to those politicians who promise them the most, and who by pillorying the "capitalists" also pillory those to blame for all their trouble. Therefore, the race toward the "Left," in the sense of an explosion of legitimate demands, is only a matter of time.

It is hardly possible to ask of politicians who are under such a pressure of expectations that they impart disagreeable realizations to their voters. They know how unpopular it is to speak of "underdevelopment," which can be overcome--if at all--only by even more work, education, and discipline. To be sure, "in principle" they have no objection to foreigners who earn good salaries, because as sought-after experts these people are prepared to go into the tropics only when there is something to be gained financially from this. But these politicians would not think of explaining these circumstances in public and thus defending the "gringos."

The masses receive almost nothing from the numerous programs in which Western governments are participating. For the media, the subject is not particularly fruitful. And in the embassies or firms, one knows how important it is to understate, if anything, one's own contribution, out of consideration for the national sensitivities. Since it is easy to ensnare people who have resentments, one hears much of imperialism and little of level-headed analyses. The inequitable world economic system alone is to blame for all the misery. If the prices for coffee and copper are high, that is only a small compensation for decades of economic extortion; if they are low, that is one more reason for demanding a new order. To be sure, no one is able to say how "fair" prices are to be obtained without the aid of the market in such a dream model.

The attitude toward family planning is characteristic. This is rejected because ostensibly the industrial states want to sneak out of their responsibilities by this means. Cultivating the profile of the enemy is thus more important than crucial aid to one's hungering neighbor. Because all development aid goes meaninglessly up in smoke if the population explosion cannot be checked. If the avalanche of people is not slowed down, then every bit of aid contributes only to putting off the catastrophe.

Since all the evil in this world is to be solely the product of the capitalist society, every other explanation for the zone of misery around the equator is rejected in the same way as the population-explosion argument. How is it that highly developed industrial states grew out of the former colonies in North America, whereas South America made only modest progress? Does the climate play a certain role after all? Whoever dares to raise such questions supposedly betrays fascist-like thinking, because of course the notion of a "natural underdevelopment" is an unbearable irritation.

A current example of how dubious the political results of intensive West-South contacts can be is the response to the German-Brazilian atomic energy agreement. This arrangement--which at first was so loudly applauded--is being attacked today by an alliance of injured interests: By professors who feel they have been underrated in terms of their scientific capabilities, by Brazilian firms which supposedly were passed over in contracts for ancillary supplies, by the lobby of hydroelectric power plants, which fear for their public credits, and by all those of progressive views to whom this close commitment to a multinational concern does not fit in with their world view. Their campaign has led to the point where Bonn's diplomats in Brasilia are seriously worried about Germany's reputation in Brazil. The Russians are spared a similar anger. No Brazilian will allege against them that they would ever offer to sell technically outdated reactors at excessive prices. On the contrary, in the Brazilian newspapers one finds articles in which the "efficient and safe" atomic power plants of the Soviets are praised.

The example of Colombia shows on the other hand that where foreign capital is not much in evidence, it is difficult for the radical leftists to provoke the masses against imperialism on this side and beyond the borders. There is much misery in Colombia. But it does not seem that misery alone is necessarily enough to drive the people to the barricades. In Colombia, one also finds the whole spectrum of fragmented revolutionary parties. But here as well, no storm of protest can be aroused by ideology alone. The mother is concerned about the high price for milk, and not about the quarrel between Moscow and Peking. After all, in the last elections not even 2 percent of the registered voters chose the leftist revolutionaries. Only when the "multinationals" throw their weight around and thus allow envy and nationalism to be activated do the apologists of revolutionary Marxism get their chance. Then they can dress up this resentment with a scientific theory.

The Colombian elite is well aware of these circumstances, although it is reluctant to talk about them openly if one obstinately asks why then is not more foreign capital poured into the country in order to tap the country's potential resources and to alleviate the poverty, only then do some of them come out with the truth--such as, for example, the former finance minister, Rodrigo Botero Montoya, a man appointed

to the North-South Commission by Willy Brandt, who defends this economic insulation as being a political decision made to guard against extremism.

This conclusion must seem downright absurd to prominent visitors from the FRG, who continually hear the desire expressed in the South for even more cooperation and aid. To be sure, whoever lives for a long time "abroad" finds more and more reasons to have doubts about the political benefits from an intensive cooperation between West and South. In any case, the strategists in the Kremlin seem to be of the opinion that development aid would be even less profitable for them. Their system would probably be discredited by this once and for all. To be sure, the Eastern Bloc can always pull off some show projects. But in the course of daily cooperation, many a socialist dreamer in the tropics would begin to see the light, such as when he cannot help noticing that half of the Russian tractors lying in the port cannot be started up, or when he has to be told that the delivery of urgently needed equipment can be considered only in the next five-year plan. If people come with the machines as well, then if anything the loss in prestige is even greater. Although the Soviet citizens are mostly tucked away in ghettos, they sometimes manage to even outdo the unconsciously arrogant North Americans in their negative effects when they do make their boorish appearances.

The model of Lenin's successors engenders interest in the Third World only as long as it remains a myth, in being an untried possibility. For Moscow, it is best to beckon with aid, but to become engaged as little as possible. The more remote the glorified ideal is, the easier it is for the revolutionaries to refer to it in their emotional protests. The success of Mao among the students of South America can be explained largely by the many thousands of kilometers separating the Yellow Sea and the Atlantic. When these Latin Maoists felt betrayed by the successors to Mao, they quickly covered their ideological nakedness with the sayings of the Albanian dictator, Enver Hoxha, whose regime they know about at most only from propaganda leaflets.

From the Soviet point of view, Cuba already lies much too close to South America. It was inevitable that Castro's failure south of the Rio Grande filtered down to the last party circle. Some 12 years ago, young Brazilians would still break off their whisky drinking when they happened to hear Radio Havana at a friend's house. Today, they assert without being asked that of course they do not want this kind of socialism either.

Moscow knows how to glorify this socialism, never experienced and therefore attractive, by employing a propaganda which is always on hand. It is natural that the African popular leaders are against capitalism and for socialism; by now, they have realized that a progressive label is the best protection against any criticism of their dictatorial style of governing. If they have failed with their economic ideas, they find

the Soviet Union at their side, and it has a lot of experience in supplying weapons to the states of the Third World. Then by means of these weapons, peoples who in a free election would never decide in favor of Marxism are forced into the socialist camp for good. When the new power structures are established, the borders are closed so that there cannot be any opportunities to make comparisons. And subsequently socialist development aid begins, whose blessings are explained to the comrades by the mass media, which have been made to toe the line. It is in the Third World with its almost unsolvable problems that the East is hoping for its great breakthrough. The East-West conflict is not being superseded by the North-South antithesis; rather, it is being intensified. The Soviet Union has absolutely no intention of helping the developing countries by accepting a common responsibility with the "capitalist" industrial states. On the contrary, through its advance in the South, it sees its chance to force the West to its knees.

12114
CSO: 3103

SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS FINLAND; NEUTRALITY DISCUSSED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Jun 80 p 10

[Article: "Finland and Switzerland Are Trying: Neutral Foreign Ministers Possibly to Consult on CSCE"]

[Text] The foreign ministers of the neutral countries in Europe will try to meet around the same conference table in the near future, if possible before the Madrid meeting of CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe].

Switzerland's Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert, who is in Finland on an official visit, and Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen held a conference on Thursday, and in the conference it was decided that they would jointly try to bring the neutral foreign ministers together for a meeting.

In theory that is not a difficult task; the European countries generally regarded as neutral are Austria, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

Principles

The foreign ministers in their official discussions noted the usefulness of traditional contacts between neutral countries at the foreign-minister level. This cooperation was practiced successfully for example in Geneva in preparing for the Helsinki meeting of CSCE in 1975 and in Belgrade at the first CSCE follow-up meeting.

Now too, apparently, a CSCE follow-up meeting would be the main item on the agenda. Another part would be proposals for a European disarmament conference and Finland's suggestion for a European disarmament program.

High-level preparations for the Madrid follow-up meeting seem to be picking up speed all the time, even though the world situation continues to be marked by a certain coolness.

The NATO foreign ministers were preparing for the CSCE follow-up Wednesday and Thursday in Ankara, capital of Turkey, and when West Germany's Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt travels to Moscow next week, there will be talk about CSCE and disarmament then as well.

Even though Finland does not consider its own proposal for the formulation of a European disarmament program to be in competition with the proposals of France and the Warsaw Pact for a disarmament conference, this kind of competitive situation seems to have come about in spite of Finland's position.

NATO decided in Ankara to support France's proposal, and Schmidt will probably bring up France's proposal unofficially in his consultations with Leonid Brezhnev, president and party leader of the Soviet Union.

Dangers

On this basis one can probably understand also the desire of the neutral countries to further promote Finland's proposal and not let it be trampled by NATO in Madrid. The proposals of France and Finland are intended to be brought up in Madrid, and NATO aims to have a clear limit placed on a disarmament conference, from which basis negotiations next year could get started.

Finland aims to have a positive mention of its proposal in the final document of the Madrid meeting and to have negotiations in many centers beginning next spring. The Finns emphasize that they are not in a hurry, but the CSCE hosts, the Spanish, are worried that the Madrid meeting will be too much concerned with disarmament, as the intention is to advance evenly along the entire front of the third subject area of CSCE.

No Problems

Also subjects of discussion were refugee questions and relations between Finland and Sweden, which were mutually agreed to be free of problems.

Earlier on Thursday morning Aubert had time to discuss relations between Finland and Switzerland with the Deputy Prime Minister, Interior Minister Eino Uusitalo (KESK [Center Pary]). Economic and social questions were particularly touched, including energy management, on which both countries have similar problems.

Foreign Minister Vayrynen also received an invitation to visit Switzerland.

In the afternoon Aubert and his party flew to Kuopio, where he was a guest of the city of Kuopio that evening. On Friday he intends to become acquainted with the exhibition of homes, take a ride on the steamship Puijo and visit the library and museum. The official visit will conclude with a dinner on Friday.

9611
CSO: 3107

CP ORGAN PUBLISHES NORDIC COMMUNISTS' MEETING COMMUNIQUE

Stockholm NY DAG in Swedish 4-10 Jul 80 p 2

[Text] Representatives of the communist parties of Scandinavia met in Oslo for 2 days to discuss what we can do in our part of the world in the fight for détente, disarmament, and peace. The common future of the Scandinavian peoples is also threatened by the strained international situation.

– It is threatened by the large quantities of weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons, that are placed in Europe or directed toward our continent.

– It is threatened by the new attempts to destroy the results of the relaxation of tensions during the period after the Helsinki conference of 1975, by the attempt to throw the world into a new cold war.

– It is threatened by the insane escalation of the armaments race after the Brussels decision in December 1979 on production and deployment of new American atomic weapons in Europe.

– It is threatened by NATO's pressure for increased military appropriations and the placing of heavy military materiel in Denmark and Norway and on vessels off the Norwegian coast. These are attempts to draw parts of Scandinavia directly into the United States' global military strategic power politics.

We must resist all this.

Appeal

The communists of Scandinavia consider that the present international situation is extremely serious. It requires Scandinavian cooperation in the fight for peace, détente, mutual trust, and international cooperation. It goes without saying that the Scandinavian communists will be in that fight wholeheartedly.

We are directing an urgent appeal to socialists and social democrats, to other political movements, to the trade union movement, to Christian organizations, and to all advocates of peace.

Let us create in each country a people's movement for peace and to prevent our cultural, historic, and material possessions from being destroyed in the horrors of a new war.

Tasks

We have common tasks. Some of them are to:

- Work to nullify the NATO decision to produce and deploy new American intermediate-distance rockets armed with atomic warheads.

- Work to get new negotiations on intermediate-distance rockets started between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the basis of equilibrium and mutual security guarantees.

- Work for a gradual disarmament and simultaneous disbandment of the military blocs.

- Work for an agreement on an atom-free zone for the Scandinavian countries with guarantees that atomic weapons will not be used against them.

- Work against parts of Scandinavia being further involved in the world-wide military plans of the United States against the Soviet Union.

- Work for Scandinavia to commit itself in all international contexts to negotiations instead of confrontation, to create trust and cooperation instead of cold war, for military détente and disarmament instead of arms build-up.

- Work to counteract the campaign of reactionary forces to create a war psychosis, and to support initiatives for détente and disarmament on the basis of mutual security and the people's right to self-determination.

In Our Interest

It is in Scandinavia's interest:

For the SALT-2 treaty to be ratified.

For negotiations on NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's intermediate-distance rockets to get started.

For progress to be made in the Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of military forces and armaments.

For the Madrid meeting on peace and security in Europe to yield concrete results as a continuation of the Helsinki Conference of 1975.

For the Madrid meeting on peace and security in Europe to decide on a conference for military détente and disarmament in Europe.

For all states to reduce their military budgets and transfer resources to new social and cultural progress, to the fight against hunger and poverty in the world.

We note with satisfaction that broad agreement prevails among our sister parties on what must be done in Scandinavia for peace, détente, and disarmament, and we direct an urgent appeal to the peoples of our Scandinavian countries for unity in the fight.

Communist Party of Denmark
Communist Party of Finland
Communist Party of Norway
Left-Wing Communist Party, Sweden

The VPK [Left-Wing Communist Party] was represented at the conference by Bror Engström, Tore Forsberg, and Bo Hammar. The FKP [Communist Party of Finland] delegation was led by party chairman Aarne Saarinen, the NKP [Communist Party of Norway] delegation by party chairman Martin Gunnar Knutsen, and the DKP [Communist Party of Denmark] delegation by Ib Nörlund, of the executive committee.

8815
CSO: 3109

'I VRADHINI' STRESSES U.S. OBLIGATION ON AEGEAN BALANCE UNDER U.S. LAW

AT3O1415 Athens I VRADHINI in Greeek 30 Jul 80 pp 1, 12

["Exclusive" unattributed article: "The United States Is Bound Under Its Own Law on Aegean Balance of Power"]

[Text] The U.S. Administration is bound under its own law to respect the balance of power in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey and at the same time U.S. policy in the East Mediterranean will be aimed toward "restoration of a stable and peaceful atmosphere."

This is clearly and emphatically provided under a law enacted by Congress and signed by President Jimmy Carter in September 1978 after the lifting of the "embargo" on Turkey for the sale of military equipment by the Washington Administration to the Ankara government.

This law (Public Law 95-384 of 9 September 1978) is the result of a series of proposals by the administration, senators and representatives and stipulates U.S. policy toward Greece, Cyprus and Turkey.

What the Law States

Specifically this law (Public Law 95-384) of 9 September 1978 which was ratified by Congress and was signed by President Carter states:

"(B) United States policy regarding Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall be directed toward the restoration of a stable and peaceful atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean region and shall therefore be governed by the following principles:...

"4) The United States will furnish security assistance for Greece and Turkey only when furnishing that assistance is intended solely for defense purposes, including when necessary to enable the recipient country to fulfill its responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and shall be designed to ensure that the present balance of military strength among countries of the region, including between Greece and Turkey is preserved. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the

transfer of defense articles to Greece or Turkey for legitimate self defense or to enable Greece or Turkey to fulfill their North Atlantic Treaty Organization obligations...."

The Ratio

Naturally the law (95-384 of 26 September 1978 [as printed]) nowhere mentions the ratio of U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey (7-10).

Yet it emphatically and very clearly refers to the responsibility of the U.S. Administration "to guarantee that today's (the present) balance of military power between the states of the area including (that) between Greece and Turkey is preserved."

This ratio (7-10) was strictly maintained by the U.S. Administration both before Law 95-384 as well as after it was enacted.

It is indicative that the necessity to preserve the balance of power in the Aegean was also recognized by West Germany. The ratio of military aid to Greece and to Turkey is not 7-10 as that of the United States but rather 3-5 which it maintained until one month ago when, with the offer of special military aid, it changed it to a ratio of 10-1 thus bringing about a strong Greek protest and the decision of Athens to reject aid in the amount of 60 million German marks.

CSO: 4908

EEC, CEMA SPECIALISTS FIND NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT

Brussels LE SOIR in French 17 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by Serge de Waersegger]

[Text] This Wednesday the talks on the expert level between the European community and the CEMA resume in Geneva. If these discussions were voluntarily taken up on the most technical level, the very fact that they are taking place nonetheless has political importance.

These two West and East European economic organizations, basically different, have maintained ambiguous relations the development of which is reminiscent of the Echternach pilgrimage, but at a tortoise pace.

Last 27 March, the European community, authorized to negotiate on behalf of the European Nine, interrupted the negotiations with the economic organization of the Eastern countries a few days after Mr Faddeev, the CEMA secretary, paid a visit to Brussels. The reason was the sterility of the talks held over a 5-year period. However it appeared that the weight of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan might have affected this suspension.

To this apparent sterility in the Brussels commission, however, the CEMA responded that it did not oppose further meetings of specialists. The commission made note of this on 2 June, confirming that it did not oppose such meetings. The result of this is the Wednesday meeting.

These meetings are totally lacking in any enthusiasm. For a long time, in the eyes of Moscow and its friends, the EEC as such has been seen as pernicious. From the point of view of the European Nine, many cast a critical eye upon an organization which seems to strengthen the supremacy of the Soviet Union over its allies on the economic level.

In fact, the approach of the Madrid conference on cooperation and safety in Europe weighs on Brussels, which does not want to appear to be the party responsible for a definitive break.

The Iceberg Slides Toward Warm Seas

Ideologically, the Common Market as it emerged from the Treaty of Rome could only be, in the eyes of Moscow, a pernicious creation. In the East, an economic evaluation has no meaning unless incorporated in a more general political view. In 1958, Europe was divided by the Cold War. An effort to unify the Western countries, even on the basis of a purely economic approach, could only come, in the eyes of Moscow, within the context of an effort to strengthen the Atlantic alliance nations, imperialist efforts to retain the colonial empires of these countries.

Moreover, on the economic level, there was a widespread view that this organization, based on a web of internal contradictions, could not fail to collapse in the short run.

In 1962, 4 years later, the European Economic Community entered the second part of its transitional phase, in other words the point of no return in the process of integration was passed.

It was agreed that trade relations would gradually come within the domain of the community. A joint farm policy was put on its feet. The African countries were tending toward collaboration with the European Six (at that time), which was to be the embassy of this kind of vast commonwealth which currently links 60 countries in Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean with the EEC.

A Change in Approach

It became evident that the prophets of doom for the Common Market in the short run were wrong. As an effort to resolve the problems of capitalism, the European Economic Community might then, in the Soviet view, have a lasting aspect which had to be taken into account. Moreover, the negotiations which began at the request of President Kennedy within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) showed that the European Six and the United States sometimes had divergent interests leading to serious passages at arms. Thus the question for the East: Mightn't the Common Market represent a barrier, although within the capitalist world, against American influence?

The change in approach was revealed in an article in PRAVDA dated 25 August 1962 setting forth 32 theses on imperialist integration in Western Europe, and coinciding with a speech by Nikita Kruschev recognizing the "fact" of the EEC.

Subsequently, but very gradually, the weight of the reality was to lead to rapprochement between the two parties on the European continent. It is true that on the trade level, this reality had a different weight for the Soviet Union and the other European members of the CEMA.

For example Soviet foreign trade is apparently not of sufficient weight--particularly from the point of view of indebtedness--as to be able to modify the guidelines of domestic policy. For a long time, the bulk of Soviet exports involved raw materials with no customs duties. Countries such as Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, on the contrary, have foreign trade with heavy weight in the national economy. The EEC, along with the United States and Canada, was viewed by them as one of the sole major suppliers of heavy equipment and goods and complete installations. Now since in order to buy, they must sell, they export finished and semi-finished and farm products to Western Europe and in so doing come up against the common foreign tariff rate which, in the European community, protects "home" products.

Thus gradually, first in such clearly established sectors as textiles, fishing, and steel, agreements were reached bilaterally between members of the CEMA individually and the European community. For the time being, it is with Romania that matters have gone farthest. Plans call for the official signing at the end of this month of an agreement governing general industrial trade between Bucharest and the European Nine, and creating a mixed committee on the ministerial level (the commissioner for foreign relations representing the community) responsible for administration of the agreement.

Making Haste Slowly

However, since 1972 a process of rapprochement between the EEC and the CEMA has been occurring. Since 1976, the two parties have been discussing a text which would ideally become an agreement between the two economic organizations.

A difficult task. First of all, because their structures are basically different. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which is the official name of the CEMA, does not, unlike the European commission, have the right to sign trade agreements on behalf of its members. Nor has it, as the EEC does, the responsibility for the trade policies of its members. Finally, only some of its members have established customs tariffs in the sense the GATT understands them.

The proposition in the CEMA text calls first of all, although implicitly, for a supranational role for the CEMA--which comes down to endorsing the Soviet preeminence over its allies--and does not recognize the exclusive competence of the European commission in the commercial realm. Consequently the two parties, in the course of occasional meetings, sought to refine the opposing positions. It is true that the commission is recognized as a fully valid negotiator, but basically, only the title, a part of the preamble, the goals and principles of the agreement, the minimum sectors covered, exchange of information and the holding of talks could be the subject of an

agreement. On the other hand, trade content, the establishment of a mixed commission to administer the agreement, and application of the system of generalized preferences, among other things, remain the subjects of negotiation.

The task will be arduous, particularly since in the view of the European commission, this agreement does not include specific trade clauses nor does it exclude the reaching of secondary agreements with the CEMA members.

5157
CSO: 3100

LONG-TIME CP LEADER QUITS PARTY AFTER LABOR DISPUTE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Jun 80 p 17

[Article by Ojvind Kyro: "Party Soldier Settles Accounts with DKP"]

[Text] "During the last 10-15 years I have left to live I shall say what I wish. I shall no longer submit to party discipline and be dictated to by mediocrities."

So says Jens Jackie Jensen, 50, who for most of his life has been a faithful party soldier in the Communist Party of Denmark (DKP), but resigned in January. As shop steward for the striking, now fired, lithographers, the DKP leadership now accuses him of carrying on a political struggle against the communists by paralyzing LAND OG FOLK with strikes.

Jens Jackie Jensen claims however, that it is the party not he, who has withdrawn from the party goal: that of being the party of the working class.

"When I joined the party in 1952 it was a true working class party, lead by people trained during the economic crisis of the 1930's and the anti-fascist struggle and toughened in the struggle for freedom during the occupation. One could always go to these old fighters and get a valid answer. Among others, I knew Hans Kirk, the author; Martin Nielsen, the chief editor; young Knud Jespersen and Hans Scherfig."

Proud of the Party

"But death took them within an unbelieveable short time, and the party changed from top to bottom. People who had never set foot in a workplace took over the party apparatus. Ideas became phrases, and the movement stagnated.

"In the past we were proud of having the party represented at almost all of the places of work in the country, and we had some clever intellectuals whom the working class cannot do without because they can write and express themselves. But social development has now led to there being a large public sector and the workers becoming fewer in number. I have nothing against pedagogues, but today they dominate the party to such a degree that the workers are a minority. The party I joined is today another, and it is a pity."

Jens Jackie Jensen has been found under the red banners every time the party called. Even today, he thinks the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1967 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968 were necessary steps, and he sympathizes with the intervention in Afghanistan. "I will say nothing ill about the Soviet Union," he says.

The Party Ran Off the Track

For 17 years he was chairman of the communist fraction of the Danish Lithographers Federation, and almost throughout his life he has been a shop steward.

But in recent years the party ran off the track, in his opinion. Carl [illegible]lsen and Preben Moller Hansen, seamen's union chairman, were expelled. "[illegible]winishness," says Jens Jackie Jensen.

He abandoned the party in January because the party discipline became too much for him and because in his opinion party policy is contributing to splitting the trade union movement. He was able to have Mogens Hover, chairman of the Lithographers Federation for 12 years, ousted last spring because "he sold out our trade area to the typographers, for the reason that the DKP thinks there is more of a political future in the Typographers Union."

Full of Lies

For 15 years Jens Jackie Jensen has been a member of the operations leadership of LAND OG FOLK. "I know other employers as well, but at LAND OG FOLK they are full of lies. For example, our operations leader Erik Anderson came to me with a negotiation proposal for reduction in the number of lithographers. On a piece of paper he had conjured up a loss of 282,000 kroner in our section, and when we asked where he got the figure he said it was in the wallet [sic]. Later, he denied having made the statement."

"We went on strike on Friday because we were sure they would have fired us for political reasons. We started the strike when it would hurt the most, when the Saturday issue of 18,000 copies was to be published.

"On Monday we had a negotiation meeting at which they told us we could come back to work, except me and the three people we had picked out to start the strike. They threatened to take the matter to the Labor Court. The printing shop foreman said that "the damage to the newspaper is so great they could not guarantee our safety." We had been on strike for two and one half days, and we were to be assaulted!"

Author of Radio Plays

"The DKP is a strange, inhuman party. It uses people as others use dishrags. If the mafia that controls the party came to power in Denmark it would be a society saturated by lies and vileness.

Jens Jackie Jensen's name is also known among the comrades in the Soviet Union. In his spare time he has written three books, one of which has been translated into Russian and published and sold widely. In addition he has written 20 radio plays, dealing among other things with Nordahl Grieg, the French Revolution, and Hans Scherfig's travel in the Soviet republic of Georgia. Suddenly, Jens Jackie Jensen's name has appeared on the front pages of newspapers, and this puzzles him somewhat. "For years I have published books and had radio plays broadcast and re-broadcast repeatedly. But because we are on strike there is suddenly a swarm of journalists around," he says.

11,256
CSO: 3106

INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY: DENMARK BEST ENERGY CONSERVER

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 9 Jul 80 p 11

[Article by Vagn Petersen]

[Text] No country in Europe is a match for Denmark when it comes to energy conservation. The International Energy Agency gave Denmark top marks this year for its efforts to limit consumption of energy.

And the top mark from the IEA is well-founded. The latest figures from Danmarks Statistik show that the total sale of petroleum products dropped 6 percent in April compared to the same month last year.

It is the first time that our energy conservation efforts have been reflected in such a striking and positive drop.

Last year we bought 14 billion kroner's worth of oil, an amount that underscores the need of conservation.

Heating Oil Down 13 Percent

The most noticeable drop is to be found in the sale of heating oil and petroleum. Here the consumption dropped by 13 percent.

Poul Nielson, minister of energy, has no doubt that it is our energy policy that, purely factually, is working as it should.

"And I do not believe there is anybody in Europe that can come up to us in this field," the minister of energy says.

The declining trend in energy consumption in April is a continuation of the trend in the first quarter of 1980.

Trend Continuing

"I believe we can still maintain the downward trend. But we cannot count on as big a down-turn as in April.

"But we can safely say that the energy policy we have built up over the years has now stood its trial by fire. We have gotten confirmation that we are going the right way," Poul Nielson emphasizes.

He says that the drop in our energy consumption may acquire great significance for the respect accorded Denmark's views in the energy policy field.

More Mass Transport

The statistical report on our energy consumption in April shows a declining trend in all energy fields.

The sale of gasoline dropped by 8 percent. More and more people are resorting to mass transport and leaving their cars at home.

The production of gas-works gas has also dropped considerably. A whole 14 percent in comparison to April 1979.

The smallest drop is found in consumption of electricity, which went down by 2 percent. It is precisely in the use of electricity that the Ministry of Energy says we must count on considerably less progress in conservation efforts. That is connected with the fact that electricity is becoming a more and more widespread form of energy in the industrial sector.

8815
CSO: 3106

NATURAL GAS TO BEGIN FLOWING IN OCTOBER 1982

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jul 80 p 3

[Text] The entire natural gas project will be carried out within the established time frame, says Poul Nielson, Minister of Energy, who has just sent a comprehensive report on the subject to the energy committee of the Folketing.

The whole scheduling is set in a very tight framework, but with built-in possibilities for overruns at the various stages of the development. The thousands of details are gathered together under one head and are now being entered in a data-processing system, so that the development can be followed continuously and with great precision, according to the report.

The basis of the scheduling is the contracts with the German gas company Ruhrgas AG for supplying natural gas from 1982 to 1984 and the agreement with Dansk Undergrunds Consortium for supplying gas from the fields in the North Sea from 1984 on. The amounts furnished will increase gradually until in 1986 they will be up to 2.6 billion cubic meters a year.

From the moment that the natural gas flows across the border and from the North Sea the pipe network will be in order, and consumers at the very end of the network can put a match to the gas. But the new report only discusses the main lines. The biggest problems may show up when it is time to lay the consumers' pipes. But as far as the main network is concerned, fixed dates have been set for putting the various parts into service.

These dates for the transmission lines are: Frøslev-Egtved October 1982, Egtved-Great Belt October 1983, North Sea-Egtved (with gas treatment plant at Nybro) October 1984, Great Belt-Dragør October 1984, Egtved-Ll. Torup October 1985. Finally, an underground reservoir will be ready in October 1986.

Firm time frames are set for the first scheduled parts of the work, so that there will be rather long periods to work in when it comes to the difficult installation phase for the individual sections.



Completion Dates for the Natural Gas Lines
[For St.Bælt read Great Belt.]

The report confirms that delivery of gas to North Slesvig by October 1982 gives very narrow time limits for that stage. Therein lies the explanation for the fact that it may be hard for Danish firms to get the necessary machines installed to be able to participate. Delays in the project will be very costly, as Ruhrgas has a right to count on completion at the time agreed on.

The report discusses only questions of time. The energy committee of the Folketing, therefore, also wants a report that shows whether the original economic calculations are holding good.

8815
CSO: 3106

DANES REVISE POLICY TOWARD FOREIGN AID FUND AFTER SCANDAL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Jul 80 p 1

[Text] There must be assurance that the money is used for the intended purpose.

Danish aid to underdeveloped countries is simmering on the lowest heat since the national auditing service found that only half of the money sent to South Africa by DANIDA [Danish International Development Aid] via IUEF--International University Exchange Fund--in Geneva reached the right recipients.

The reason was partly that a South African agent had infiltrated the organization for the last 3 years and partly that for a longer period a deficit of about 5 million kroner had been covered by making use of money that was intended for South African refugees.

In an answer to Karl Kjelgaard (Conservative), Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen said that no Danish state funds will be given to the IUEF until there is assurance that the money will be used for as intended. And funds from the "apartheid grant" will always be submitted to the finance committee of the Folketing before they are paid out.

About 2,600 refugees who are studying at universities abroad on funds put at the disposal of the IUEF have now gotten into a bind. For the time being the Swedish organization for underdeveloped countries, SIDA [Swedish International Development Aid] has taken over the most pressing financing of the stipends, which will now be renewed.

Need for the Danish Money

"But very soon there will be need for Danish state funds for these students, whom we have provided for many years with places at educational institutions in countries where there had not previously been especially good coverage in the educational field," Poul Brandrup, consultant on underdeveloped countries with DUF, the Joint Council of Danish Youth, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. Since 1975 DUF has channeled the Danish state contribution from DANIDA to IUEF.

Poul Brandrup is now in Geneva to gather material on the stipendiaries who are to have money from Denmark in the future. To carry on the scholarships that Denmark has financed in the past, the finance committee will decide on a contribution of 5 to 7 million kroner.

"There have been no problems thus far with appropriations for scholarship programs for South African and Latin American refugees," says Poul Brandrup, "but of course we shall comply with the Foreign Ministry's demand for a check on the state funds. Today there are two SIDA representative in Geneva to ensure that the funds are safely forwarded."

8815
CSO: 3106

AUTHORITIES FEAR TERRORIST ATTACK ON SCHMIDT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Jul 80 pp 21-23

[Article: "Last Chance--Bonn Security Experts Fear That Terrorists Are Planning a Bomb Attack on Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt"]

[Text] "That is a very hot potato unfortunately," said a high-ranking official of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, hemming and hawing.

The matter the Bonn official is reluctant to talk about is this: More than ever before, the security authorities are secretly concerned about the possibility of Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt falling victim to an assassination attempt in this election year. Experts are seeing concrete indications of terrorists preparing an attempt against the chancellor.

Schmidt has long since been considered in great jeopardy, particularly since his coup in Mogadishu; in the last few weeks, however, the threat against him has become acute. According to a comment made by an official of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne last Thursday, there exists "a very serious danger in the very near future; it may sound macabre, but it is those people's last chance."

The pursuers of the terrorists have believed long since that the German terrorists have only enough striking power left for one assassination attempt against a prominent politician or high government official. Like Schmidt, CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss is among those in particular danger.

According to experts at the Federal Criminal Police Bureau (BKA), a kidnaping such as happened in the case of Employers Association President Hanns Martin Schleyer is not too likely. They think the terrorists are not strong enough for that. The hard core, they say, now consists of only 20 men and women. Moreover, they say, following the successes by the authorities in the past couple of years, the infrastructure of the terrorist underground has been damaged to such an extent that it is hardly possible to stage a kidnaping with any prospect of success.

But perhaps--the theory of the police goes--the terrorists prove with an assassination attempt that they are still capable of action; having had to put up with one failure after another since 1978, they are now concerned that they might lose the last remnants of reputation and support among their supporters at home and abroad.

In trying to trace the crazy deliberations of their opponents, the authorities also claim to have found out why the chancellor in particular is in extreme danger; they think that the terrorists are betting on an assassination of Schmidt causing an enormous shock, with the result that sooner or later the people would call for a strong man--Franz Josef Strauss.

The Bavarian--the terrorists are said to believe--had shown in the major crisis sessions during the Schleyer kidnaping that in the cleanup he did not intend to pay much attention to basic rights; Strauss had even talked about martial law and courts-martial.

It appears plausible to the authorities that the terrorists would prefer a wildly acting Chancellor Strauss to Schmidt, for they would be rid of their recruiting problems, probably being able to count on new recruits as a result of a big cleanup a la Strauss.

The security people also think they know the method with which the terrorists could get to the chancellor. According to their findings, Schmidt might be subjected to a bomb attack. They regard an attempt against him with firearms as not very likely because of the comprehensive security measures and the great risk involved for the perpetrators.

The great catch in Paris on 5 May confirmed the experts in this theory of theirs. On the basis of tips from the Middle East, the BKA in cooperation with French authorities seized five women suspected of terrorism, Sieglinde Hofmann, Ingrid Barabass, Regina Nicolai, Karola Magg and Karin Kamp-Muennichow. In their hideout at 4 Rue Flatters on the edge of the Quartier Latin, the police discovered 109 Kilograms of chemicals, including sodium chlorate--all suited for manufacturing a bomb of immense explosive power.

A member of the cabinet reported the fantastic things BKA experts had told him about the explosive potential of the Paris find: "One kilogram would have sufficed to achieve the same effect as in the attempt against Carrero Blanco, and 5 kilograms would have been sufficient for blowing up the entire bridge at which the attempt against Haig was made."

Spanish Prime Minister Carrero Blanco had been killed by a bomb on 20 December 1973 en route from early mass in Madrid. Basque extremists had buried 50 kilograms of dynamite and exploded it by remote control. The force of the explosion was so great as to create a crater 3 meters deep and 12 meters wide in Claudio Coello Street, propelling Carrero's car about 17 meters high over the roof of a Jesuit convent.

And later in June 1979 the former NATO supreme commander U.S. Gen Alexander M. Haig barely escaped a bomb attack at a bridge in Belgium during which two people in his party were wounded and one escort vehicle was badly damaged.

In addition to large quantities of homemade ammunition the police found in the hideout of the Parisian ladies quintet a Grundig radio set for the remote control of model airplanes with which it is possible to ignite explosives from a distance of about 1 kilometer. Further evidence of the possibility that the terrorists had planned an attack on Schmidt was discovered by the BKA specialists later during a systematic search of the entire contents of the apartments.

Another reason why the authorities are so worried is that the BKA for some time has not been in direct touch with the hard core of the German terrorists. It is only by chance that police found out late last week that suspected terrorists who had long been assumed to be abroad were again operating on West German soil.

Shortly after 0700 Friday morning on Baden-Wuerttemberg Highway 1130, between Bietigheim-Bissingen and Unterriexingen, a brown GLS Volkswagen Rabbit with French license plates collided head on with a gravel truck traveling in the opposite direction. In the wrecked car, police discovered arms, French passports and a police FuG 9 radio set. The two fatally wounded Rabbit passengers were:

--Juliane Plambeck, 28, who had been arrested as a member of the 2 June terrorist movement 5 years ago, had escaped from a Berlin prison in 1976 together with three women accomplices and was being sought in connection with the attempts against Berlin Superior Court Justice Guenter von Drenkmann, Berlin CDU Chairman Peter Lorenz, Federal Attorney General Siegfried Buback, banker Juergen Ponto and Employers Association President Schleyer; and

--Wolfgang Beer, 26, who had gone underground after serving a 4½ year juvenile court sentence for membership in the Red Army Faction and other offenses and last year was given a year's suspended sentence for having occupied the Frankfurt offices of the GERMAN PRESS AGENCY together with 10 accomplices.

The fatal accidents confirmed the BKA pursuers in their suspicion that the danger had not lessened by any means. Experience gathered in the attempts against Ponto and Schleyer had shown that the terrorists stolidly stuck to a plan once they had conceived it and would not be put off by successes scored by pursuing police.

The managers at SPD headquarters nevertheless for the time being do not want to reduce the number of Schmidt's election appearances. At first (according to a person in his entourage) Schmidt reacted with "dismay" to the Paris discoveries. By now, however, he is calculating the danger callously. He has told friends that there are actually only three possibilities of Strauss becoming chancellor--in case of a rapid rise in unemployment or a steep drop in the economy (neither very likely) "or if I am killed."

Leading CDU/CSU politicians too have been wondering what the consequences of an attempt against Schmidt might be. Unlike terrorists or police, they are by no means convinced of the macabre kind of support that would accrue to their man Strauss.

According to one member of the CDU Presidium, the SPD would quickly come up with a successor whom the CDU/CSU too would have to support--in an all-party government.

8790
CSO: 3103

LAMBSDORFF INTERVIEWED ON STATE OF ECONOMY, COALITION

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 18 Jul 80 pp 17-18

[Interview with Otto Graf Lambsdorff, minister for economics, by Michael Jungblut]

[Jungblut] Graf Lambsdorff, the legislative term did not end happily for the social-liberal coalition. Confusion reigned supreme in the final Bundestag votes. Was that due to organizational mistakes or does it signify more than meets the eye? Is the coalition in crisis?

[Lambsdorff] It was certainly more than an organizational breakdown. On the occasion of the vote on the conscientious objector law a mistake was committed, which I consider quite serious from two aspects: For one because in the result conscientious objection is preserved in a way not wanted even by those who rejected the draft proposal in the arbitration committee. This amounts to an "all or nothing" policy such as the FDP and I have always felt to be quite wrong. For the other because such drastic events as a vote with fluctuating majorities (which have not happened since 1969) should not really be allowed to occur in the final days of a legislative term.

[Jungblut] What is behind all this?

[Lambsdorff] To my mind this development is a sign that the left wing of the Social Democratic parliamentary party does not intend to consider the coalition partner and the common political assignment, and that many in the Social Democratic parliamentary party are intent on achieving an absolute majority at the forthcoming Bundestag elections...

[Jungblut] ...A result which you would like to prevent.

[Lambsdorff] It is obvious that the FDP cannot enjoy such a prospect. At the same time I know that Helmut Schmidt is none too happy either considering the possibility--in case his party gains the absolute majority--of having to deal with this group of deputies on the left.

[Jungblut] Politically even more explosive than the voting confusion on the occasion of the new alternative service regulation and the traffic

noise abatement law could be the dispute about a Mannesmann law by which this firm is to continue to be held to the rules of the coal and steel co-determination law although the prerequisites have effectively ceased to exist. Is it not really quite odd for the SPD in conjunction with the left wing of the CDU to force through some special legislation against the wishes of the Free Democrats?

[Lambsdorff] Such a group motion--actually one should say a "so-called group motion," because it was signed by nearly all SPD deputies including some cabinet members--evidently aims to be realized after the election, aided by the absolute majority. There can be no FDP agreement to such a questionable project either before or after 5 October. When Herr Wehner goes so far as to talk of a special Bundestag session during the vacations I must assume that the Social democrats are seeking a majority either by calling on the help of the CDU social committees, or that they wish to signal that they will carry such legislation after the election with an absolute majority. Both prospects are displeasing.

[Jungblut] Let us assume Wehner is able to carry his Mannesmann law with the assistance of some sections of the CDU--what would that mean for the time after the election? Could you govern another 4 years with such a partner?

[Lambsdorff] In my opinion the consequences would be serious. We will in fact have to ask whether we can continue as if nothing had happened. I would think that this is not possible. The Federal Chancellor also is quite aware that the ensuing discord would be severe.

[Jungblut] The rumbling, therefore, is not just theatrical thunder but indicates genuinely heavy weather. Is it a sign that, after more than 10 years of social-liberal coalition, the stock of common issues has gradually been exhausted?

[Lambsdorff] The thunder and lightning at the conclusion of the legislative term seem to me to be an indication that frivolity has set in--and, surprisingly, affected even the SPD majority leader--with respect to the handling of the coalition; after my 8 years of experiences in the Bundestag this is a new phenomenon.

[Jungblut] If, after 5 October, the coalition issue should come up again, will the common interests still persisting with the SPD prevail, or will the disputes among which the dissension about the conservation of the coal and steel codetermination at Mannesmann is only one?

[Lambsdorff] All the others are the "potential breaking points" between FDP and SPD, which have always been there--in taxation, economic and social policy. The break has never actually happened, because we always managed to find the necessary compromise. I am often asked whether I could not conduct a far better economic policy together with the CDU. This simply disregards

the fact that economics represent only one aspect, however important. In matters of foreign and German policy, for example, my friends and I are firmly convinced that there can be no community with the kind of policy advocated by Franz Josef Strauss. The same applies to the German policy of the CDU.

[Jungblut] Would it not be possible to explain the greater emphasis on the potential breaking points or the breaking points of the kind of the latest codetermination conflict by the fact that the influence of the left in the FDP has declined once more, that the Free Democrats are now more removed from the Social Democrats and steering another course than 4 years ago?

[Lambsdorff] Whoever steers a straight line is bound to run into a tree sooner or later. Curves do exist, and one has to take them. Incidentally, the so-called leftists in the FDP parliamentary group are particularly angry at the behavior of their left friends in the SPD parliamentary party. They are rightly exasperated by their attitude during the debate on aid to Turkey, conscientious objection and the dispute about the protection of the citizen against traffic noise. As regards the last, they desire to go much further than the Social Democrats.

[Jungblut] Is it wrong to assume that the FDP is now less leftist?

[Lambsdorff] There may be a more precise market economic attitude in the field of economic and taxation policy--with the consequences arising therefrom in our relations with the coalition partner. Actually that is not surprising. When you consider how the business situation may develop and, especially, how the additional burden imposed by rising energy costs affects our distributive potential and compels us to produce better performances in the worldwide competition, it is obvious that we should emphasize the market economic bases of our success in the past 30 years in preference to the topic of redistribution which tended to be somewhat excessively stressed in the past 10 years.

[Jungblut] The cue here is the term "competition." Currently the Federal Republic is suffering from what amounts to Japan hysteria. A few days ago, on the first page of its business section, a major German newspaper carried no less than five articles and reports dealing with the inroads of the Japanese competition. Some people are suddenly acting as if only trade barriers and government subsidies could save the last remnants of German industry from perdition. The German car industry also is playing a dangerous game: When one reads on all sides how superior the Japanese are, car buyers are bound to come to the conclusion that they would be stupid to buy any more European products.

[Lambsdorff] To give the German car producers their due I must say that their public statements so far have always supported the Federal Government's anti-protectionist policy. I have talked to the representatives of all firms in the industry and made it quite clear that the difficulties of one

industry cannot possibly make us adopt a policy which is certain to land the entire national economy in trouble. Our country depends on exports. We cannot begin to close off our markets. The retribution aimed at us by the others would wreak far greater havoc here than vice versa.

On the other hand it is quite true that we have experienced a sudden and abrupt awakening as regards the Japanese competition. This shows clearly that we failed early enough to deal with a danger which, though only now definite, has been looming on the horizon for some time past. I have long called on German industry to look to the Japanese competition--and also to tackle the Japanese market. I was not listened to with any sense of urgency. Now the day of reckoning has dawned for some of them. But they cannot expect government protection for the consequences of their entrepreneurial mistakes. The same applies to the labor unions who will have to acknowledge that workers in Japan work harder and more productively. On the other hand Japanese wages are no longer that far removed from European standards.

[Jungblut] At the present time the greatest danger seems to be for German industry itself to lose impetus.

[Lambsdorff] In their sales literature the Japanese very adroitly stress the fuel conserving engines of their cars. For many years and on many occasions the Federal Government advised the car industry--in private and in public--to use the same argument. Yet the advertisements of the German car industry still fail to reflect this. Top and cruising speeds continue to receive undue emphasis. They are hardly mentioned in Japanese advertisements.

[Jungblut] Nevertheless there is no reason at all why an industry reckoned to be among the strongest and most efficient in the world as far as exports are concerned, should call for help--even though at this time only the works councils are publicly doing this.

[Lambsdorff] Our products are competitive. The car industry has some excellent years behind it and possesses large reserves. It can well outlast an export offensive by the Japanese competition. I do have my doubts, though, whether it will be able to continue its carefree price policy--as per the motto: We conclude standard wage agreements with the IG [industrial labor union] Metal and subsequently simply raise the price--the consumer will pay anything. Competition is for the benefit of the consumer, not that of the producer.

[Jungblut] The American car producers certainly committed even more serious mistakes. All the more strident is their call for protection.

[Lambsdorff] From the economic standpoint the United States, enjoying a large domestic market, are in a better position to afford a sealing-off than we are. The political consequences, on the other hand, would be devastating. I am very glad, therefore, that President Carter made no such concessions when he visited Detroit. At the summit conference in Venice he

obligated himself, together with us, not to take any protectionist steps Despite the tremendous political pressure he is holding fast...

[Jungblut] ...something quite exceptional for him.

[Lambsdorff] I would not like to put it that way. But if it were so, even more credit is due.

[Jungblut] If no protectionism there will possibly be more concentration. The fate of the American car industry does show on the one hand that even supercorporations are not invulnerable to catastrophic reverses. On the other hand it is possible that the European car producers may consider that their salvation must come from further mergers. The monopoly commission has now suggested that the law should provide for the potential dismemberment of firms whenever the law prohibiting restraints on competition has failed in good time to prevent a concentration damaging to competition. Do you think that this makes sense?

[Lambsdorff] In recent years we have witnessed the emergence of a development which is based on mistakes in the original law prohibiting restraints on competition. The CDU/CSU watered down this law from the very outset, as a result of industry lobbying and against Ludwig Erhard's initial conception. Only on the occasion of the third amending bill did it decide to cooperate in strengthening the competition law. That, however, was not good enough to correct the false development of earlier years. We will therefore have to thoroughly review the topic deconcentration in the next legislative term. Whether this review will end in other laws I am unable to say at this point. Other countries experiences with deconcentration are not exactly encouraging. Incidentally, it at all possible, I would prefer not to initiate any new legislation from the Ministry for Economics. I'd rather see some abolished.

[Jungblut] Where do you see your important future tasks?

[Lambsdorff] We must attempt first of all to keep open the world markets, encourage investment by entrepreneurs, strengthen the competitiveness of small and medium firms. The 1980's will not be a decade of consumerism; instead the emphasis will have to be on investments--if we really want to get over the consequences of the energy crisis.

11698
CSO: 3103

POLITICAL ASYLUM LAW BECOMING CAMPAIGN ISSUE

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by ckn: "Influx of Asylum-Seekers Becoming Big Election Campaign Issue"]

[Text] Bonn, 13 July--The question of the FRG asylum procedure and the treatment of the growing number of foreigners seeking asylum is a domestic policy issue that is becoming more and more controversial. Although the minister presidents of the Laender agreed to delay until after 5 October--the date of the Bundestag electrion--the discussion of new regulations concerning the distribution of foreigners seeking asylum to various FRG Laender, the dispute between the Federal Covernment and the Laender as well as party representatives is becoming more and more acrimonious.

On Sunday, during an appearance on BEJTSCHLANI FUNK, Wallmann (CDU) accused the Federal Government of "tota failure" when it comes to the asylum problem. Either the minister for the interior did not want to take notice of the events of the last few years that were in his jurisdiction or he actually did not notice them. As a consequence, the FRG is totally unprepared.

Minister of the Interior Baum (FDP), on the other hand, warned over the weekend to refrain from making an issue of who's job it is to deal with the asylum issue and even dragging it into the election campaign. These questions could only be solved through sensible cooperation between the Federal Government and the Laender. When he appeared on German Television, Baum expressed his concern about the practice used in dealing with the stream of asylum-seekers, which could destroy the basic principle of granting asylum. Baum criticized the city of Frankfurt's refusal to accept any more asylum-seekers, and, so he stated, even when the city's special situation is taken into consideration, other ways of solving the problem would have been appropriate.

Wallmann lodged a vigorous protest against the accusations that were voiced following the refusal to accept Afghans and Ethiopians who had arrived in Frankfurt. During the past few years, Frankfurt had done more

than any other city. In the meantime, people who were seeking and looking for asylum have been housed under conditions that are simply not humane. The city had no more facilities to accept these people and it had reached the absolute limit of options that had been available till that time. The situation which had arisen could only be handled in accordance with the law, which provides that asylum-seekers be referred to the Federal Office for Foreigners, which is located in Zirndorf.

Wallmann supported the concept that the right to asylum, as established in the Basic Law, must be preserved under all circumstances. If the FRG, however, continued to permit all asylum-seekers to enter the country indiscriminately, as has been the case to date, without asking the question whether they are political refugees or not, and if the Federal Government continues its criminal neglect of those duties that are within its jurisdiction in accordance with the Asylum Law, a situation will certainly arise that "will no longer permit us to continue granting political asylum." When considering the conditions in Frankfurt, there is no other city that is comparable; 25 percent of the people who are living there are foreign citizens. The Hessian Land government did absolutely nothing for more than 2 years. Only very recently decisions have been made to relieve the city. Nevertheless, the decision to erect a camp on the edge of the airport is not a benevolent deed for the city, but a responsibility of the Land which had been long overdue. Furthermore, it should not be necessary for the Federal Government to ask for permission when establishing such central camps, because it is obligated, according to Articles 39 and 40, to put up such camps in consultation with the Laender.

8991
CSO: 3103

FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY DISCUSSED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Jul 80 p 10

[Article by Thankmar von Muenchhausen: "Fascinated by the Germans"]

[Text] Paris, 9 July--What do the French think about their German neighbors? What do they know about them, what do they learn about them? These questions arise while a French president is paying an official visit to the FRG for the second time in 18 years, while year after year millions of Germans--the largest tourist group--set out to spend a part of their vacation in France. For about 10 years responsible people have been aware of the importance of information for the smooth functioning of cooperation between the 2 countries. Seminars are held, journalists are invited from the neighboring country, scientific investigations are completed. It is certain that the FRG thinks a lot more about its image abroad than does France.

Prof Alfred Grosser comments about the inability of the French press in the thirties to recognize the nature and danger of National Socialism--something Swiss newspapers were able to do--"French newspapers of this period were poorly equipped for independent foreign reporting. It was doubtless a lack of means, but also a lack of interest." This historical conclusion is still true. While German newspaper readers have more information about France than about any other country, French readers learn relatively little about the FRG.

About 60 German journalists, 40 of the correspondents from newspapers and magazines, report regularly from Paris. But only 18 French journalists work in Bonn, 6 of them for daily newspapers and a weekly magazine (PARIS-MATCH). Although two-thirds of the total number of French daily newspapers are published and read in the provinces--which limits the influence of the Parisian press that people prefer to quote--only two big regional newspapers, LA VOIX DU NORD (Lille) and OUEST-FRANCE (Rennes), keep a common correspondent in Bonn. If there is a hot story, so-called special correspondents are turned loose on the neighboring country. Not all of them speak German.

The two television organizations, TF 1 and Antenne 2, show the FRG in their daily news broadcasts, but only rarely in detailed documentaries and analyses. On the other hand there is no lack of films and series from the time of the Third Reich, World War II and the German occupation.

Nevertheless the picture of the FRG in French public opinion is not totally negative. It is ambivalent. The reconstruction of West Germany, the economic power of the FRG, make an impression. The "German model" has become an established concept. It is no secret that Prime Minister Barre orients his economic policy on the pattern of his neighbor and uses its success as a standard. Many Frenchmen suspect that the economic miracle is not just the result of industrious work but also of the "social consensus" between employers and employees, a state that is made impossible in France by "patrons" and unions equally. The other side of the coin is that the Germans appear not only as always to be gluttons for work but recently, because of their prosperity, as the "Americans of Europe." The normal competition in foreign trade is simplified in extreme cases to an "economic war" against France in order to justify protectionist measures, for example by the old-Gaullist Debre. Such convenient false opinions stick.

The same thing is true in the area of politics. The FRG has replaced the UK, with its permanent crisis, as the model democracy in the minds of Frenchmen. But the concern about "militaristic Germany," which replaced the French preference for "romantic Germany" with the defeat of 1870-71, still exists, sharpened by the rather artificial fear of a revival of National Socialism. Whenever an occasion presents itself--in recent years it was the action against terrorism in the FRG--left-wing or leftist liberal commentators diligently conjure the ghosts of the past. The communist party newspaper L'HUMANITE is even doing it on the occasion of Giscard's state visit: "How can we talk about common destiny, when the old demons of pan-Germanism in the FRG have not been laid and where, for example, a Franz Josef Strauss has so much influence that the French head of state thinks it appropriate to meet him in the next few days. There is no need to remind people of Hitlerism and the neo-Nazis, but how can the democratic perspectives of France be reconciled with measures like the political exclusion from professions in the FRG?"

In connection with the showing of the Hitler film in 1977 the weekly magazine LE POINT claimed that 20 percent of young people in Germany had a positive attitude to Hitler. The rival publication L'EXPRESS was content with 8 percent. The Soviet secret service KGB uses such climates of opinion for its work of spreading false information: in 1957 four Czechoslovak agents carried out an explosives attack against the prefect of Strasbourg and a French parliamentary delegation, which was then exploited in propaganda as proof of neo-Nazi activity in the FRG. The state security service of the GDR maintains contact with some conservative persons and circles who can rediscover Prussianism, which they

publicly combat and secretly admire, only in communist Germany. Communists and Gaullists work with the supposed danger of "American hegemony" in Western Europe. That does not prevent the recent apprehension of many French politicians: the FRG could be striving for reunification with the help of the Soviet Union--at the price of neutralization.

Published opinion and public opinion are not identical. For the "moyen Francais," the average Frenchman, the neighbor on the other side of the Rhine is no longer sworn enemy. The once-popular term "Boche" for the unpopular German has fallen into disuse--only the weekly magazine LE CANARD ENCHAINE still uses it out of old loyalty. Young people, whose awareness of history is beginning to weaken in France as well, would not know what to make of this leftover. Student surveys for the Franco-German Youth League show that young people see the two countries becoming more alike. Still, the attitude of the French toward the Germans is most accurately described as "fascination," in which there is both attraction and a shudder of fear. A public opinion poll a few days before Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Germany showed that the French admire no other nation in Western Europe as much as the Germans (33 percent; the Netherlands 12 percent), but that they also distrust no other nation as much or get annoyed about one as much (for both, 25 percent; Italy 19 percent). Almost one-fifth of the French wou'd have no objection to a German European president, but more than one-half do not want to see nuclear weapons in German hands.

9581
CSO: 3103

NEW CP-FRONT PARTY PROGRAM DROPS 'NEUTRALITY' TERM

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 26 Jun 80 p 8

[Article: "SKDL Drops Finnish Neutrality from its Program"]

[Text] The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic Union] has dropped the word "neutrality" from its set of terms to describe Finland's foreign policy line.

Our foreign policy is characterized in the program of principles approved on 18 May by the Finnish People's Deomcratic Union as "a policy of neighborly friendship"; in another place it is said that because of the YYA [Mutual Cooperation, Understanding and Assistance] treaty, "The position of our country is independent and clear and outside international speculation."

In the previous program of principles approved in 1967, foreign policy was said to be "Based on the principle of active peaceful coexistence and a neutrality policy enjoying general international trust."

Factions Unanimous on the New Program

According to SKDL Chairman Kalevi Kivisto, there were no differences of opinion between the majority and minority of the SKDL over the central questions of principle.

As late as the middle of the 1970's, the minority severely criticized the inclusion of Socialism in the goals of the SKDL. In the opinion of the minority, the goals of the SKDL should have been limited to reforms while capitalism prevailed and talk of a socialist society left out.

The SKDL wants to gather people together on the basis of a socialist utopia. An invitation is, however, extended also to those who do not consider themselves supporters of socialism but who desire to fight on behalf of the poor and the downtrodden.

The program defines the SKDL as by nature a very open organization; commitment to the entire program is not required: "Participation in activity can be based on goals of a similar direction in some questions of detail."

In the program, the fact that the SKDL does not require a philosophical commitment from its members is specifically stressed. In fact a specific appeal is made for Christians who want a socialist change to join in their activities.

A Left-Center Basis for Government

The People's Democrats would like a governmental basis like the present one to continue.

It would be hoped that a coalition government of the left and the center would defend the rights of workers and frustrate the strivings of the right and big capital.

The SKDL also believes that "deeper reforms" will be gained from cooperation between left and center when the factions can "Mature to agree about these reforms."

Among the "deeper reforms" the SKDL continues to count its traditional aims for broadening economic democracy. A "democratic direction" of the economy means for the SKDL the bringing of the most important areas of production under the direction of public power; large monopolies and commercial banks would be nationalized in addition.

In the program, enterprise democracy and the direct affect of individuals on matters affecting their own life circle and all of society are also emphasized, for example by means of government on the submunicipal level, citizens' initiatives, etc.

Ecological Ideas the Newest Principle

The most modern items in the program in terms of policy principles include ecological ideas: "Human activity must be in harmony with the rest of nature, so that natural systems can preserve their ability to function."

So the SKDL has an attitude of reservation toward the development of nuclear power: "The exploitation of nuclear power in its present form is apparently a passing phase in our energy management," the program observes.

The SKDL approaches the supporters of new movements in other social goals in addition to environmental questions. Quality goals are presented in the program such as interesting work, training of people for creativity, and freedom from cult ideologies.

9611
CSO: 3107

POORER COUNTRIES TO GET SMALLER SHARE OF DEVELOPMENT AID BUDGET

Economic Relations

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Mar 80 p 37

[Article by Tellervo Yrjama: "Amount of Development Aid Increases, Quality Weakens; Poorer Countries' Share of Finland's Aid Monies to Shrink in Future"]

[Text] Some energetic Finns in autumn 1978 caught political decision makers by surprise by loudly demanding an increase in the appropriation of development aid monies. Its interest raised by the renaissance in development aid the parliament, with a show of its strength, voted a budget increase of 25 million to increase the total aid appropriation to 405 million markkas.

Extensive public opinion has for long been on the rise in Finland in favor of development aid and development aid has long been on a healthy rise. Although the increase in the appropriation is a highly desireable matter, in practise it leads to a deterioration in the quality of the aid. The increased funds are used also to support Finnish trade in the developing countries.

Aid Quantity Control

Finland has been able to take pride in international circles about the high quality of its development aid, although the quantity of Finland's aid ranks quite low among the industrialized countries. In 1978 nearly all of the aid was given as an outright gift, and then nearly half of it gradually seeped to the developed countries.

"The quality of the development aid weakens as the quantity of the aid funds increase," says Wilhelm Breitenstein, chief of the development collaboration department in the Foreign Ministry. The poorer countries can no longer be given as large a proportion of the aid as heretofore. "No one else does that anymore and I don't understand why we should either," he reasons.

Breitenstein stresses that the clear and natural goal should be as heretofore, namely, that a substantial proportion of the aid ought to continue to go to those 29 countries that the United Naitonas has classed as the least developed.

But, Breitenstein points out, the poorest countries have difficulty in assimilating the aid. They are unable to make use of all the aid they receive, he says.

The Gap Widens

Some experts on the subject of development aid are concerned by the fact that the aid appears to be receding from its traditional idealistic nature and is gradually causing a chasm to develop between the developed and the less developed countries. During the 1960's and the 1970's economic growth took place in the poorest countries at a clearly slower pace than in the countries that were at a medium level of development.

Breitenstein feels that the idea of development aid is sometimes interpreted in a narrow sense as some kind of gift-based assistance to the poor. He is paging for "fresh approach." In Breitenstein's view the question ought to concern the methods by which the living conditions of the poorest segments of population can be improved. According to Breitenstein, the recipient has the last word in the controlling of the aid.

Finland stresses the fact that it strives to best serve the basic needs of a population by orienting the major part of its aid toward development in the rural areas. The rural populations most frequently live in the most desperate conditions in the developing countries.

Finland seeks in the future to diversify its contacts with the developing countries, according to Breitenstein. He stresses Finland's own interests and needs to create economic relations in the developing countries on a broader basis than heretofore.

"The tune of the future is that the development collaboration and the economic collaboration must advance abreast with each other," says Breitenstein.

Of the development aid 60 percent is channeled directly to the developing countries as bilateral aid and 40 percent is channeled through various organizations as multilateral aid. The largest part of the bilateral aid goes to the so-called program countries and to the category undesignated by country. The increases in the aid monies are directed mainly to the new program countries, to aid undesignated by country, to catastrophe assistance, and to Tekera, which is the Technical Development Collaboration Fund.

Preliminary Reporting by Enterprises

Development funds may be granted also, at the wish of the developing country, for the purpose of conducting suitability studies by means of which a Finnish

enterprise may, for example, suggest to a small country the construction of the most suitable hydroelectric generating plant. After this, a Finnish enterprise may sell equipment and services that the developing country may need at the powerplant.

On a purely trade basis, the risk involved would be great. According to Breitenstein, the development aid provides protection for the developing countries and valuable professional experience to the Finnish enterprises.

"This does not make the development collaboration department into an establishment for the promoting of export trade," says Breitenstein.

The Promotion of Export Trade

According to various points of view, a change is taking place in the goals established for Finnish development aid. Simultaneously with the increase in economic interest in recent years in regard to commerce with the developing countries, "there has arisen abreast of the social goals of the development aid, perhaps even in advance of those goals, a desire to use the aid as a means of promoting Finland's own export trade," says manager Niilo Ryti of the Jaakko Poyry engineering firm.

In Ryti's opinion, it is essential in the industrialization planning in many developing countries that a portion of the plan be funded by aid money.

In a report prepared in 1978, the development collaboration committee recommended that development aid and the promoting of export trade be kept separate. The committee recommended also that the development aid be directed mainly to the poorer countries and that mainly economic collaboration be practised with the more developed countries.

International economics lecturer Jan Otto Andersson, who is also a deputy member of the deliberative body for economic relations with the developing countries that was formed during autumn 1979, feels that the orientation of the development aid is shifting away from the humanitarian and social objectives. The development aid is now, more so than formerly, being tied to the interests of the Finnish exporters, of which the establishing of Tekera is one example.

Andersson feels that the development aid should not be used to promote exports, but rather, to support long-term economic relations with the developing countries.

Room for Expansion

There is room for improvement in Finland's economic and commercial relations with the Third World. During recent years about 10 percent of Finland's foreign trade has been with the developing countries.

The increasing interest shown in the economic sphere for trade with the developing countries could have an effect on the choice of companion in the development collaboration.

Professor Ryti conjectures that it may be difficult to find viable objectives that are of interest to Finnish firms from among the poorest of countries because the rate of growth in such countries, from the practical point of view, is nil. The final result is regrettably negative in respect to the poorest countries. They can be given only pure development aid, says Professor Ryti.

The professor has an idea "from the old gentlemen's luncheon club" in which the development aid officials and the representatives of an economy would discuss together into which projects and into which ways the joint efforts ought to be directed.

According to the officials, the development aid has growth possibilities only if aid is continued to the poorest countries in the future and the economic sphere is enticed to join in the collaborative ventures.



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

24 *Suomen kehitysapu on tänä vuonna 0,23 prosenttia bruttokansantuotteesta. Sitä aiotaan nostaa 0,32 prosenttiin 1982 ja 0,64 prosenttiin 1987 mennessä. YK:n tavoite 0,7 prosenttia on yhä lupausten varassa — Suomi lupasi 60-luvulla nostaa apunsa tuohon tavoitteeseen jo vuoteen 1975 mennessä.*

Key:

(1) Distribution of Development Aid in 1980
(2) 405.4 million markkas
(3) Multilateral aid 164.8 million markkas
(4) United Nations Development Program
(5) Social welfare programs
(6) International Development Fund establishments
(7) Foodstuffs programs
(8) Others
(9) Bilateral aid 225.6 million markkas
(10) Program countries
(11) Tanzania
(12) Zambia
(13) Other program countries
(14) Undesignated by country
(15) Joint Nordic countries
(16) Ventures by international organizations
(17) Humanitarian aid
(18) Tekera (Technical Development Collaboration Fund)

(19) Others
(20) This figure does not include the assistance monies given to the World Bank (8.1 million markkaa) and to the Latin-American Development Bank (6.7 million markkaa) because those monies are included in the expenditures of the Ministry of State Finances.
(21) Public Development Aid, in percentage of gross national product /Note: comma is a decimal point/
(22) The Goal
(23) Year
(24) Finland's development aid in 1980 is 0.23 percent of the gross national product. The intention is to raise it to 0.32 percent in 1982 and to 0.64 percent by 1987. The United Nations goal of 0.7 percent is still in the promise stage--during the 1960's Finland had promised to raise her share of the aid to that goal by 1975.

Six Recipient Countries

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Mar 80 p 37

[Text] As of the beginning of 1980 six countries were receiving development aid from Finland. Egypt, Kenya, and Sri Lanka joined Zambia, Tanzania, and Vietnam in the fold of important collaborating countries.

The major part of the bilateral development aid goes to these program countries and the remaining 30 percent is granted by individual ventures to various countries.

The administration has decided to adopt Namibia as a program country after it attains independence. As the appropriated aid funds hopefully increase, the intention is to increase the number of program countries by two or three.

The overall amount for each program country is appropriated 3 years in advance. Programing negotiations, in which the use of the development aid is agreed upon precisely, are conducted annually. The programing procedure introduces the desired element of planning into the development collaboration.

Recommendations As the Basis

"Finland adopted new program countries at the recommendation of the Development Aid Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This committee recommended a broader geographic distribution because the very poorest countries have great difficulty in accepting additional aid," says Wilhelm Breitenstein, the highest development aid official.

He bases the increasing of the number of program countries on the recommendation of the Jansson committee. That committee recommended that, as the amount of the development funds increases, the aid objectives be increased mainly from among the poor Arabic countries and the Latin American countries.

The selecting and adopting of new program countries are decisions that were made by officials, says member of parliament Lasse Lehtinen (Social Democrat).

The Jansson committee, that had been making recommendations, went out of existence at the end of 1978 and the new body for the negotiating of economic relations with the developing countries was not established until October 1979. Lehtinen is one of four deputy chairman of this negotiating body. He said that it had been noted that the officials in the negotiating body had had ample time to reach agreement on many matters.

Zambia, Tanzania, and Vietnam were previously known as the chief recipient countries. [illegible] of designation was abandoned, according to Breitenstein, because of political-psychological reasons. It was considered to be irritating, unilateral, and degrading by the developing countries. Some of the developing countries considered Finland to be practicing political discrimination.

The adoption of the new countries has brought political balance into the country-wise distribution within the program. Two countries, Tanzania and Vietnam, are inclined toward socialism and Egypt, Kenya, and Sri Lanka are capitalistic. Zambia is a borderline case.

"Favorable Experiences"

Of the new program countries Kenya nad Egypt, an Arab country with limited resources, were chosen because of the favorable experience with them in the past, according to Breitenstein. Finland has had collaborative ventures with both of them.

Egypt is the country that receives more development aid than any other country in the world, which amounts to $75 per person. In the case of Egypt it is pointed out also that it is willing to accept development loans. Development aid is given to the old program countries in the form of gifts.

In addition, an entirely new small country, Sri Lanka, with whom the Nordic countries have had previous experience, was adopted into the program, said Breitenstein.

Countries such as Egypt, Kenya, and Sri Lanka are typical developing countries in that they all have industrial production structures inherited from the days of colonial rule, vast bureaucracies, and millions of destitute people.

Individual Ventures

Along with the program countries, Finland carries on bilateral collaboration by granting funds for the carrying out of specific ventures. The amount in the 1980 budget under the heading undesignated by country jumped from 36 million to 55 million. This amount is used mainly to finance individual projects, but some of that amount may be distributed also to program countries, which in 1980 are Zambia and Tanzania.

During 1979 the largest portion of the project aid money undesignated by country went to Kenya, Egypt, and Namibia. Some of the funds were used also for smaller ventures in countries such as Indonesia, Honduras, North Yemen,

Malesia, the Phillippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, and the minuscule island republic of St. Lucia in the Caribbean Sea.

The project objectives become assigned, according to Breitenstein, when Finland responds to a request from a developing country. The project aid most frequently is of the consultant aid type in which Finnish firms provide the aid.

Finland is asked to provide aid in the fields of electrical technology, electric power economics, and forestry, in which fields Finland has world-renowned consultation firms, according to Breitenstein.

"We cannot do anything about the fact that we are frequently asked to provide services that these firms outstanding in their fields can provide," says Breitenstein.

Criticism of Recipient Selection

Although the project aid is granted for the funding of specific ventures, rather than to a specific country, the selecting of the countries to receive project aid can be criticized from several aspects.

Researcher Unto Vesa, a deputy member of the consultative body for relations with the developing countries, expresses astonishment at the countries selected for project aid. He feels that there is no guarantee in countries such as Indonesia, the Phillippines, Honduras, and Malesia that the development aid will accrue to benefit the majority of the population.

Finland has stressed in various connections that the development aid should be directed toward those countries whose own development planning serves basic social needs and benefits the majority of the population.

Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party) stated in the budget discussions that Finland attaches special attention to the way in which the country that receives aid guarentees equal political, economic, social, and cultural rights to all of its citizens.

In 1978 Amnesty International, a human rights organization, cited gross violations of human rights in the Phillippines, Indonesia, Honduras, and Malesia. Martial law has been in force in the Phillippines since 1972. The United Nations General Assembly has condemned the Indonesian attack on East Timor in several of its resolutions.

The enterprise spirit of Finnish firms has increased in recent times in the direction of Southeast Asia. The government as well has given support to these exporting efforts.

Rekola's Tours

Seven agreements, which at first will be financed from development collaboration funds, were concluded for Finnish firms during autumn 1979 when Foreign

Trade Minister Esko Rekola made a tour to the Phillippines, Indonesia, Malesia, and Sri Lanka, on which he was accompanied by development collaboration officials.

Another tour to Southeast Asia, also led by Rekola, recently returned from Thailand, Singapore, and Burma. One development collaboration agreement was concluded on that tour.

The number of project countries has increased to more than ten in a relatively short time. The Nokia firm has electrification projects currently in progress in Indonesia and Malaysia and a rubber industry study underway in Malaysia. The Pinnagro firm is planning dairy industries in Indonesia and the Phillipines. The Poyry engineering firm has a forestry project in Burma. The Tampella, Valmet, Wartsila, Poyry, and Enso-gutzeit firms are studying the possibilities of a cellulose and paper mill in Indonesia and a forest industry venture in Malaysia.

Vesa sees lack of planning in the adopting of new project countries. He conjectures that new countries have been adopted abreast of the old merely to support a few Finnish export firms.

Lehtinen feels that the number of alternative countries is small. He believes that the deliberative body led by Education Minister Par Stenback will be able, because of its prestige, to guide the making of development aid decisions in the future.

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AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM DEFENDS AID POLICY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Jun 80 p 7

[Article by Timo Lipponen: "Vietnam's Offer to Finland: 'Search for Oil Would Bring Favorable Sales'"]

[Text] Finland is continuing development aid and commercial cooperation with Vietnam. This in spite of the fact that about 200,000 Vietnamese soldiers are still in Cambodia and some of them participated in the attacks on Thailand the first part of this week.

"Finland has acted correctly, and the projects now underway will be completed," says Finland's Ambassador to Vietnam, Unto Korhonen.

Interest in our country toward Vietnam results partly from an offer that the Vietnamese leadership has made to Finland.

"Vietnam's oil reserves are still a big secret, but they are known to exist in the country's great continental shelf," Korhonen tells.

The Canadians, Italians and French have already made drillings, and the Soviet Union already has an agreement to begin searching and drilling. But Finland can also find a vein.

Oil Delivery

"We have been offered the opportunity to participate in the search for oil and the development of an oil industry," the ambassador mentions.

He emphasizes that this kind of planning, now still in a very early stage, could later turn out to Finland's benefit: as a trustworthy working partner in development, our country would receive crude oil from Vietnam with advantageous delivery conditions. Machines and equipment connected with the activity would be imported from Finland to cover the cost as much as possible.

Aggression an Obstacle to Aid?

Three years ago, the statement issued by the joint development committee headed by Jan-Magnus Jansson noted that development aid in a target country can be interrupted if the state in question is solving its foreign policy problems by aggression directed at other countries.

Ambassador Unto Korhonen supposes that this possibility has also been discussed in Finland. But the concept of aggression is not unambiguous in his opinion.

"Vietnam has about 200,000 troops in Cambodia and 50,000 in Laos. The overthrow of Pol Pot meant the end of an extremely bloody rule," says Korhonen, comparing it with Tanzania's attack on Uganda.

Repair Dock the Main Object

At this moment, Finland's main project in Vietnam is the construction of the Pha Rung repair dock, for which the Foreign Ministry granted 37 million marks in additional funds last week.

According to Unto Korhonen, work on the dock, which began in 1978, will first be completed, and new things will be studied after that--in about 2 years when the dock is finished.

Korhonen can't say anything precise about the start of a possible oil project, because "We are listening and communicating what we hear to the appropriate circles," as he expressed the matter.

No Losses From Development Aid

Vietnam is also interested in the wood-processing field, and a severe need for paper would bring a possibility for involvement of Finnish expertise.

Finland's bilateral development aid to Vietnam is of the so-called "gift aid" variety, but it is tied to Finnish execution. With 20 people working on the Pha Rung dock (40 by the end of the year) and sales of machines and work force also to Sweden's cellulose project, the ambassador makes the following conclusion:

"A really significant portion of the investments comes back."

In the income and expense estimates for 1979 and 1980 Finland budgeted 28 million marks for bilateral development aid to Vietnam.

Common Problems

Ambassador Unto Korhonen, whose post is now in Hanoi, has worked in Vietnam only 2 months, but he is familiar with developing countries:

his previous post was in Zambia, and before that he was in charge of the office of bilateral development cooperation in the UM [foreign ministry].

"Vietnam and Zambia have a common problem, even though one of them has a coastline and the other does not. Access to the sea for both is poor. The Haiphong harbor can be compared to having [Sweden's] Malmo as a single joint harbor for all of the Scandinavian countries," says Korhonen.

Vietnam's Lin

At the same time as Vietnam is expanding its influence in neighboring countries, the mother country itself is in turmoil. The conversion of "westernized" South Vietnam to Marxism-Leninism is not an easy task, as the boat people demonstrated.

According to Korhonen, the government situation is nevertheless stable. There are practically no organized forces promoting a change. However, the constitution is being revised and parliamentary elections are approaching. Thus changes in personnel are possible in the future.

China Is Not Feared

In Hanoi diplomatic circles China is not considered a threat to Vietnam, in spite of the recent conflicts. China is not expected to come to the aid Thailand, even though Vietnamese forces attacked from Cambodia over the Thai border.

"The attack on Thailand was a logical consequence of Vietnamese thinking on security. With Thailand returning Cambodian refugees there would come guerrillas opposing the Heng Samrin government.

"But it would have been good for Vietnam to have found better solutions, for example through negotiations," Korhonen concludes.

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TREATY WITH USSR CREATES PARADOX FOR NEUTRALITY POLICY

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 27 Jun 80 p 2

[Article: "A Stable Scandinavia in Sight, Tensions between Finland's Neutrality Policy and the YYA Treaty Examined by Candidate Timo Lipponen"]

[Text] Finland's neutrality policy is based on the YYA [Mutual Cooperation, Understanding and Assistance] treaty. This establishes an exacting framework for foreign policy, because the military articles of the YYA agreement define also the situation in which reliance on neutrality is not possible. This article is based on the "pro gradu" thesis of Timo Lipponen, candidate in political science, approved in May at the University of Helsinki.

In his memoirs which were published last May, Cabinet Secretary Leif Leifland, the highest-ranking official of the Foreign Ministry of Sweden, warns his country's government of the consequences of a possible weakening of defense readiness.

According to the document, this kind of development is increased by the pressure of NATO on Norway and Denmark and the pressure of the Soviet Union on Finland. It is observed in the document that Finnish officials have expressed concern about the matter. Finland's neutrality and even its independence could be in danger.

Even if the danger of Finland's independence is counted as an exaggeration of the Swedes, the rest of the conclusions do correspond to Finland's official foreign policy. Among others, the second defense committee in Parliament has emphasized the importance of a strong defense in Sweden to a stable situation in Scandinavia.

Changes in the "Scandinavian balance" could be reflected in Denmark and Norway through membership in NATO and in Finland through the YYA treaty.

Diplomatic Note Crisis and Military Exercises

Unlike membership in NATO, the YYA treaty is not a military alliance including an automatic requirement to assist. From this it follows that

Finland must maintain a certain detachment with respect to its partner in the treaty. Otherwise the YYA treaty could in practice take on the character of an alliance.

In peacetime, the credibility of Finland's neutrality policy would suffer and the YYA treaty could change, against its original purpose, into a means of spreading a conflict in the direction of the Scandinavian countries.

The concern of Finns expressed in the document of the Swedish foreign ministry about counteractivities by NATO in the event of a weakened Swedish defense also appear in practical Finnish politics.

Some clear similarities between the years 1961 and 1978 namely show the stability of Finland's foreign policy line of action. The former instance concerned the diplomatic note crisis, and the second concerned joint military exercises with the Soviet Union.

In 1961, President Urho Kekkonen explained to Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev in Novosibirsk the main reasons why it would be advantageous to the Soviet Union to give up its demand to conduct military negotiations in accordance with article 2 of the YYA treaty:

"Beginning the military consultations mentioned could cause a certain amount of unrest and war psychosis in the Scandinavian countries."

When in the year 1978 Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov was said to have proposed joint military exercises between Finland and the Soviet Union, Finnish Defense Minister Taisto Tahkamaa answered a parliamentary question about the matter with essentially the same reasons as Kekkonen 17 years earlier:

"Speculation about the organization of military exercises tends to generate uncertainty in regard to the established situation in Northern Europe."

"The government of Finland knows that the government of the Soviet Union is not attempting to change the stable situation in Scandinavia."

The credibility of Finland's neutrality policy would suffer both from military negotiations (1961) and from peacetime military cooperation (1978). The aim is thus that in the Soviet Union's trust in Finland's desire to follow the provisions of the YYA treaty should be maintained, but at the same time care is taken to insure that military cooperation remains only within the framework defined by the YYA treaty.

If Finland by its actions were to set off preventive countermeasures by NATO in Northern Europe, the possibilities for following a policy of neutrality would be lost.

Insulation of Scandinavia

The insulation of Scandinavia from the effects of a crisis breaking out elsewhere in Europe is one of the main goals of Finnish foreign and security policy.

We have attempted to decrease the need for the kind of balancing in military policy explained above by striving for a strengthening through treaties of the peaceful situation in the area of Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea. In this way a firmer basis for the practice of a neutrality policy would be obtained.

The attempt to insulate Scandinavia appears most clearly in four security policy proposals: the initiatives to make Scandinavia a nuclear-free zone in 1963 and 1978, the initiative for a border treaty with Norway in 1965, and a comprehensive regularization of relations with the Germanies in 1971.

The diplomatic note crisis of 1961, when the Soviet Union first demanded military negotiations according to article 2 of the YYA treaty, can be considered the starting point for Finland's active foreign policy--which the above-mentioned initiatives represent. The Soviet Union gave as a reason the danger of attack by West Germany.

Peculiar Neutrality

The Soviet Union's demand illustrated well the political tension between the YYA treaty and Finland's neutrality policy. Finland's peculiar neutrality is based precisely on the preamble to this treaty, in which Finland is mentioned as striving to keep away from conflicts of interest among the great powers.

One preamble does not, of course, guarantee neutrality, but it gives Finland the possibility of proceeding in its own way.

However, the YYA treaty also defines the situation in which following of a policy of neutrality is not possible. Articles 1 and 2 provide for military cooperation with the Soviet Union.

As the international situation changes, the YYA treaty either strengthens or weakens neutrality policy. An increase of tension in the area around Finland increases pressure for fulfillment of responsibilities under the treaty. Even negotiations according to article 2 of the YYA treaty with a great power belonging to a military alliance would take away the basis of credibility in Finland's neutrality policy.

The Finnish Paradox

So we arrive at the foreign-policy problem mentioned before. Trust in the fulfillment of the YYA treaty must be maintained, but on the other

hand aiming, by means of initiative in security policy, for the preservation or strengthening of a situation in which the policy most advantageous for Finland--a policy of neutrality--can be implemented.

As is often observed in joint communiques between Finland and the Soviet Union, the purpose of the YYA treaty is the preservation of peace. From this the paradox of Finnish foreign policy derives: the YYA treaty accomplishes its function best, from the viewpoint of both parties, when its military articles do not need to be implemented.

President Urho Kekkonen told the Paasikivi Society in 1969 that he himself proposed to Krushchev in 1961 that Finland would follow developments in Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea area and hoped that the Soviet Union would rescind its demand for military negotiations.

In western countries, Finland was regarded at that time as having become the Kremlin's "watch dog." Even Khrushchev hardly noticed why, after the military negotiations had been circumvented, Kekkonen considered the last paragraph of the Novosibirsk communication as a success for Finland.

First of all, the circumvention of negotiations according to the YYA treaty at least for this time proved that Finland's interpretation of article 2 of the treaty was correct: a threat of attack means an expression of will on both sides.

In addition, the responsibility to watch undertaken by Finland emphasized our country's own role in detecting and averting a threat of attack. The way was open for an active foreign policy.

The YYA Treaty and Nuclear Options

The diplomatic note crisis showed that international tension--then the Berlin crisis--is reflected sensitively in Scandinavia.

A continuing problem for the foreign policy of our country has in fact been the NATO policy of Norway and Denmark. Both countries have announced that they do not approve of foreign troops or nuclear weapons in their area. Especially the tenability of restrictions on nuclear weapons by Norway and Denmark has been a central question for Finland's neutrality policy.

If for example Norway and Denmark were to give up their restrictions on nuclear weapons as a NATO response to a crisis smoldering somewhere else, it would cause an immediate reaction on the part of the Soviet Union: they would demand military negotiations with Finland on the basis of article 2 of the YYA treaty. Our country could permanently lose the preconditions for its neutrality policy.

Finland attempted by its Scandinavia initiative precisely to prevent the reflective effects in Scandinavia of an international crisis. The 1963

and 1978 initiatives to make Scandinavia a nuclear-free zone were aimed at eliminating Norway's and Denmark's nuclear options, or in other words, at destroying even the theoretical possibility that these countries could be given nuclear assistance.

Thus the core of Finland's security problem is not in the YYA treaty with the Soviet Union but in the NATO relationships of Norway, Denmark and West Germany. The Scandinavia initiatives were not, however, realized, and so the nuclear options still exist.

Precisely because the possibility of Norway and Denmark receiving nuclear weapons from their allies is a pathway that reflects international conflicts back onto Scandinavia, Finland's initiatives do not require Norway and Denmark to resign from NATO itself. Also the initiative to demilitarize the common border between Finland and Norway was directed at stabilization of conditions.

Newest Problem: The Cruise Missile

The zero initiative renewed in the year 1978 brought also some new elements with it. The cruise missile was now seen as a threatening weapon, which might start up the YYA treaty. In the same year, Yuri Komissarov reminded [us] of [our] responsibilities under the YYA treaty.

An improved 1978 edition of the nuclear-free zone was proposed in the form of a quid-pro-quo deal: Norway and Denmark were offered so-called negative security guarantees; in other words the great powers would commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons against Scandinavian countries. Basing and flight paths of cruise missiles would thus remain outside the nuclear-free zone. But the initiative did not receive the hoped-for acceptance.

The most successful initiative toward creating a situation in which the YYA treaty would not have to be implemented was made in 1971. The so-called comprehensive regularization or German package would, in the form proposed by Finland, have even brought great-power guarantees for preservation of peace in Scandinavia.

For in return for recognizing the German nations, Finland namely wanted a recognition in the treaties of its neutrality and assurance of a rejection of the use or threat of force--"whether by the government of one of the parties to the treaty or by another country acting from the territory of one of the parties."

The Germanies did not agree to this wording, but they did agree to rejection of the use of force and "recognition" of Finland's neutrality policy. East Germany's treaty promise to respect Finland's attempt to follow a neutrality policy went in some ways further than the Soviet Union's assurances at the level of communiques.

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TRADE WITH CUBA EXPANDED, ECONOMIC AGREEMENT SIGNED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 27 Jun 80 p 23

[Text] The minutes of the fifth meeting of the joint technical-economic commission between Finland and Cuba were signed on Thursday in Helsinki. The minutes were signed for Finland by Division Chief Pauli Opas and for Cuba by Director Raul Taladrid of his country's state committee on economic cooperation.

Trade between Finland and Cuba, which up to now has been rather modest, and possibilities for development of economic cooperation were examined by the joint commission. Possibilities for cooperation were considered good, especially in the fields of mining, wood- and sugar-processing, and harbor construction.

Trade between the countries has been more lively this year than in the previous year. Finland's exports to Cuba were estimated last year at 17 million marks and import from Cuba at 80 million marks. During the first 4 months of this year, imports have already been 48 million marks or almost 1 1/2 times as much compared to the same time period last year. Exports on their part were only 5 million marks or 35 percent less than the beginning of last year.

Also signed on Thursday was an agreement for cooperation between the chambers of commerce of Finland and Cuba. The agreement aims at, among other things, promoting commercial relations between chamber members in Finland and Cuba.

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BERLINGUER EXPLAINS PCI OBJECTIONS TO ECONOMIC MEASURES

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 6 Jul 80 pp 1, 15

[Report by G. F. P. on 5 July question and answer session with PCI General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer at rally in Pesaro: "Berlinguer Confirms and Explains the 'No' to the Government's Measures"]

> [Text] Give and take between the crowd and the PCI secretary at Pesaro. As a workers' party we cannot agree to a policy that makes the workers alone pay for the crisis and does not free us from the blackmail of alternating inflation and recession. The profound difference from the provisions of 1976-77.

The PCI has reasons for not accepting the general line and the substance of the government's recent economic measures and for fighting for substantial changes in these measures in parliament. These reasons were stated in Pesaro yesterday afternoon by Comrade Enrico Berlinguer in a debate on the great Square of the People, which was thronged with thousands of citizens and workers, youth and ladies. In the center of the lively give-and-take (hundreds of questions were gathered, mainly by private radio and TV) many subjects were brought up: the country's situation and international issues, relations between the parties and the formation of alliances, and the Communists' role and their proposals for dealing with the crisis. We shall report Berlinguer's answers in the third person.

The PCI secretary said first of all that the crisis we are faced with is not a transitory matter and is not even merely an economic crisis. It involves the institutions, the state's relationship with the parties and citizens, and the very rules, ideas, and dominant values of society. This is mentioned particularly to help understand the reaction of the workers, laborers, and especially the youth and women.

As for the economy, the crisis is caused by the system's being incapable of solving the problems of production development and employment along with that of the stability of the lira. If production growth can be guaranteed for a certain length of time, inflation immediately starts up and quickly becomes uncontrollable. This has happened in the last 12 months. The figures for

the increase in industrial production certainly make it impossible to speak of stagnation in Italy (and in the Common Market), but on the other hand, the figure for inflation has reached 21 percent. Yet if the traditional remedies continue to be used for inflation (e.g. the so-called cooling off of the economy), production and employment are immediately thrown into depression.

The government's action, Enrico Berlinguer pointed out in speaking to the subject of dozens of Pesaro citizens' questions, is exactly of this sort: it does not slow down the rise in prices, nor does it guarantee increased production and employment. In any case, it leaves the country sitting in a Scotch bath of combined inflation and recession. And the workers' incomes are hard hit.

At this point, Berlinguer replied to someone who tried to find a contradiction in our present attitude and our attitude in the autumn of 1976, when we supported by abstentions the government then in power. He pointed out that there is a great difference between the actions taken then and those approved by the present government. The 1976-77 financial and economic policies did not harm wages but supported their buying power through 1978; rather than favor inflation, the policies brought it down from 24 to 16 percent; rather than slow production down, they stimulated a strong recovery lasting through the early months of this year. Besides, in the measures agreed to then contained reforms that laid the bases for planned development.

The truth is that when the latest measures were to be put into effect, the DC [Christian Democratic Party] and the government began to resist, and then the Pandolfi plan was announced; one of its main objectives is to reduce hourly wages. That was when we Communists went into the opposition because in this area among others we were faced with a rightward movement by the government and the majority. Berlinguer emphasized that the Communists' former and present positions are clearly consistent. The actions taken recently by the Council of Ministers not only make no progress in the quality of economic and social development but also leave things essentially as they have been: they leave the country on a seesaw between inflation and recession; moreover, they burden the great mass of workers with a financial maneuver that is confused in terms of both decreased buying power and increased unemployment.

Our "no" is not instrumental, i.e. dictated purely and simply by the fact that we are in the opposition; rather, it is the "no" of a workers' and people's party that consistently defends the workers' interests and is at the same time very concerned about the general fate of the country and the route it is taking.

Besides, the PCI general secretary added, the government's action completely ignores the observation our Socialist comrades and we made in 1976-77 and that many businessmen considered with interest. The observation was that this seesaw between inflation and recession could be interrupted only if the crisis ceased to be treated solely in bookkeeping terms by regulating the money supply, the cost of credit and, above all, the cost of labor.

If the government had begun by debating and deciding where public money and investments would be directed (and, thereby, what their quality would be), how public administration would function (and, thereby, what its efficiency and the quality of public service would be), how taxes would be collected (and, thereby, what kind and quality of taxation there would be), if, in other words, the government had begun to address itself to the problem of the quality of development, it would not have taken the measures that it has. A barely decent and serious economic policy--as our 15th congress emphasized (Berlinguer said)--deals with causes and structural roots of inflation, otherwise inflation cannot be controlled or eliminated.

When you consider that Italian agricultural contracts are centuries old, that the cost of transportation is 3-4 times that of other countries, that small and medium businesses must wait a long time for credit, even two or three times as long as big businesses or German or French businesses, when you add to all this--Berlinguer told the crowd thronging the Square of the People--the elephantiasis, parasitism and foot-dragging of our public, economic, and administrative structures, and you add the plundering and squandering of the country's and government's resources to support the power system of the DC and its allies, you realize that all this waste cannot be recovered, and this inefficiency cannot be overcome by temporary, superficial measures that only put off for a few months the basic problems of our economy, and that we are feeling the delayed consequences of the old ways that have brought about the structural crisis in which the country has been struggling for years. But above all, it is intolerable that these inadequate measures, which only delay and do not solve the real problems, be paid for by the working class and the people.

In the question and answer session, Comrade Berlinguer also spoke specifically about the "solidarity fund," which is to be raised by a collection of 0.5 percent of the workers' income. We Communists, he said, are not opposed in principle to the idea of collecting a direct workers' contribution to investments in a new economic policy that would show real solidarity with the people of the South. However, the "fund" was thought up and proposed by the government, which gives no guarantee that the sum collected will be used productively. It exposes the unions to the serious danger of themselves becoming the object of demands of workers in crisis businesses or even of becoming their own opponents.

That is why the PCI does not approve or accept the general line and substance of the government measures and will work in parliament to change them. Berlinguer concluded by saying that our concrete counterproposals will be defined by ample, democratic consultation with the working masses and public opinion, and we will try to meet with the unions of workers and other employees, as well as with the PSI and other democratic parties.

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BERLINGUER CHIDES EEC ON INEFFECTIVENESS, OUTLINES NEW INITIATIVES

Milan L'UNITA in Italian 9 Jul 80 pp 1, 19

[Article (report on PCI General Secretary Berlinguer's 8 July address to the European Parliament: "The Community Is in Crisis and Should Take on Another Role"]

[Text] Strassburg--Luxemburg took over the half-year chairmanship of the European Community Council of Ministers after it had been held for 6 months by Italy. There were two reasons for the changeover's dominating the July session of the European Parliament. This parliament had been elected by universal suffrage in June 1979 and was thus celebrating its first anniversary. First, incoming Luxemburg Chairman Gaston Thorn presented his program; second, Comrade Enrico Berlinguer addressed the parliament. The following is the complete text of the PCI general secretary's speech. We shall also give further reports on the events at the Strassburg parliament.

The crisis of the European Community, Berlinguer said, has become so far-reaching that the Community cannot conceivably last long under present conditions. We have actually reached the point where either an innovative initiative is taken to give the process of integration new substance and strength or the Community faces the danger, nay, the certainty of decline and disintegration. And I want to say from the outset that I have not found in Chairman Thorn's remarks, however diligent, competent, and improved they may be, any awareness of this fact and dilemma.

The last six months have been some of the stormiest in the history of the Community. At times, the limits of paralysis and rupture were reached and exceeded. The Italian chairmanship--and I regret to have to say this even though I belong to a party actively opposing the government in power in my country--did nothing to begin removing the fundamental causes of the situation the Community is in. The vaunted compromise with Great Britain, which consisted mainly in giving Britain everything it asked for, has certainly not made possible a solution to the internal problems of the Community; rather, they have been prolonged and aggravated.

Let the facts speak; they are well known and have been often cited in this very assembly: almost 7 million are unemployed in the nine countries; inflation rates are increasing; productivity is now heading toward recession; and imbalanced development is working to the disadvantage of the weaker nations and regions. And despite all that, the percentage of agricultural expenditures (which are, as we know, almost exclusively price supports and minimally funds used for a policy of structural renovation) rose to 74 percent of the budget for 1980! Now that is a fact that shows clearly the incapability of the Community organizations and especially the Council of Ministers (and therefore of the governments of the nine countries) of achieving a program of renewal. This necessarily implies the decisive launching of common policies in various fields (economic, social, energy, etc.); the will and knowledge to do this has been lacking despite so many words and pledges. How can this be kept up when the prospect is now near that the very resources of the Community will be exhausted?

Why have the development and implementation of common policies not gone forward? We think it is because the dominant economic and political groups have great interests in liberalizing markets and trade (and this has in fact been the main aspect of the integration process) but have no equal interest in adopting common policies that would pursue the objective of an economically and socially more balanced and just development in all areas of the Community. In fact, that would call into question a whole set of privileges and powers. This confirms our conviction that to get out of the crisis we need a process of integration that would be developed on an even basis with a renewal of the present economic and social assets. Certain reforms are necessary in the life and function of European institutions, but the decisive step to be taken is the full employment of the working classes. This is one of the reasons for the insistent quest for every possible agreement with all the forces, parties, and social organizations that are based on the working class and all the classes of people on this continent.

Another great necessity is proving decisive: that of moving courageously toward the full affirmation of the specific role that Europe is expected to play in world affairs. I appreciate Chairman Thorn's evaluation of the problems of political cooperation. But the fact remains that the only relevant autonomous act of the Community has been the declaration of Venice, particularly the part affirming the necessity of associating the PLO to the solution of the Middle Eastern problem. Other positive initiatives have come not from the Community but from some of its member states. They show what great possibilities might be opened up by Europe's taking initiatives in world affairs. In what direction?

In recent months we have often discussed in this very hall the events that have marked the rapid worsening of the international situation: the events in Iran, the new spurt in the nuclearmissiles arms race, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the proposals and acts in response to the Soviet Union and Iran. The major risk in this worsening situation is the growing opposition of the two superpowers; within the Community and the Atlantic alliance (and this very parliament) two positions are in conflict.

The first position is that of those who follow and even exaggerate the line of the present American administration; they have maintained the necessity of absolute prejudice, shows of force, and punitive retribution. The second position, on the other hand, has been inspired by the conviction that none of the conflicts and problems--arms reductions, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, or the repatriation of American hostages--can be solved if no contribution is made to halt the spiraling hostility between the two superpowers and the two blocs. This spiral can only contribute to rigidifying positions and heightening tensions and contains within it a catastrophic logic that brings nuclear war closer.

It is therefore necessary to condemn every violation of international law and to demand that it be respected but without ever interrupting dialogue and negotiation. This position has been supported in recent months in various ways and with various initiatives by both many non-aligned countries and other political forces and governments within the Atlantic alliance that, out of respect for its obligations, have managed to resist U.S. pressure under the conviction that negotiation and detente are the necessary condition and most solid basis of security in Europe and in international relations generally.

This allows me to recall the policy line that we have consistently supported and that we have followed up with our initiatives in Italy, Europe, and in many contacts outside of Europe.

Chancellor Schmidt's trip to Moscow (and I am surprised that Chairman Thorn did not even mention it) proves that this way is right and practicable. After months of tension there has been a first ray of light that reopens the possibility of negotiations on arms reductions and that shows more generally that negotiation is possible also to solve the other problems, even the most serious and explosive one: the relationship between the North and South of the world. And here we see an irreplaceable function that is to be expected from a European Community that presents itself and acts with all the weight of a political entity.

We are now on the eve of the Madrid conference, and it is a basic interest of Europe's that this occasion assure increased application by all countries subscribing to the Helsinki Agreement in making way for new progress in East-West cooperation. We ask the Council of Ministers and the Luxemburg chairman that the nine nations set a positive and open policy for political cooperation at the Madrid conference and that this parliament be informed and debate in sufficient time the directions that the nine nations intend to follow.

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COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST INVOLVEMENT IN ECONOMIC, LABOR SECTORS

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 13 Jul 80 pp 7-9

[Interview with Public Sector Industry Minister Gianni de Michelis by Alberto Statera: "Who Has Won? Craxi, and Then You'll See..."]

[Text] Rome--In the final analysis, did the government win or did the unions, the PCI, the socialist and Christian Democratic left win out in the matter of the economic provisions package? The latter parties did block any alteration of the automatic wage index.

Gianni De Michelis, the Public Sector Industry minister is now the point man for Craxi's PSI [Italian Socialist Party] majority, and he has no doubts; for the first time since the Cossiga II government was formed, he is positively euphoric: "The government," he says, "has won by a mile, but the unions have not lost. We could have had the economic measures without a consensus or the consensus without the measures. Now we have both the measures and the consensus. For the third time in three months we have reached a basic agreement with the unions, and for the first time we have a full-fledged government that can free itself from the tutelage of the three majority-party secretaries."

[Question] But what about the PCI and the socialist left?

[Answer] We are beginning to understand that I, we are the socialist left.

[Question] Then you are among those calling for the head of Vice-Secretary Claudio Signorile, who was your main competitor till a few months ago?

[Answer] I am not asking for his head, I am only saying that Claudio has made his umpteenth big mistake and that's all. The PSI leadership, with the bigwigs of the left, is unanimous about the line that has been chosen. Claudio didn't add things up right when he gave the impression that the majority was irreparably split.

[Question] What about the PCI?

[Answer] They were saying we had moved against the workers, but the truth is that nobody believed them, for the simple reason that the provisions that have been approved clearly bear the mark of the left.

[Question] The communist workers don't think so; they opposed Giorgio Benvenuto, calling him Craxi's lackey.

[Answer] Today, Giorgio can return in triumph to the factories, because the PCI's game has been uncovered; they can no longer maintain that the PSI guarantees leftist machinations.

[Question] The confrontation between the Communists and Socialists is not due to that alone.

[Answer] The confrontation is the Communists' fault. To keep from breaking with the PCI in March, we forced the situation by excluding Liberals and Social Democrats from the government and pledging national solidarity. We campaigned under the banner of the union of the left. Now what do they want? Why are they poisoning the air? They are saying nothing else than that this government should be thrown out because it has a noticeable socialist tinge. But they know full well that this government has gotten the biggest consensus in the last 10 years.

[Question] Yet, Honorable De Michelis, the Communist Central Committee has made a flood of advances to you Socialists.

[Answer] Yes, but with incredible basic contradictions. Actually, the PCI would like to dialogue with a PSI different from what it really is. They want a groundswell that will overthrow Craxi. But Craxi is strong and will last many years. Besides, Berlinguer has not given up on the historic compromise and is aggravating conditions that may widen the schizophrenic split between the top and bottom of the PCI.

[Question] In any case, how can Socialist ministers govern when they are so clearly opposed to the PCI?

[Answer] Actually, it isn't hard. It is sufficient to be consistent with ourselves, even to the exclusion of the PCI. And the unions and Communist workers want government, not crisis. If the PCI keeps asking for crisis, it will worsen the split that exists between the leadership and the grass roots. If there is no government, who will solve the SIR [expansion unknown] crisis? Who will prevent layoffs? The workers well know that in the 70's protest and government crisis might have been the forerunners of revolution; today they know that beyond crisis there is dark emptiness and the risk of reaction. We hope that the Communist leadership understands this and will return to a correct understanding of the relationship between the forces of the left.

[Question] When you defend both the Communists' autonomy and your image as a leftist party vis-a-vis the DC [Christian Democratic] orators, doesn't this mean you are oscillating between a hard line and demagogy in actual practice?

[Answer] Of course, we are caught between Scylla and Charybdis. But we will not let ourselves be subjugated to the DC's logic, nor will we be subordinate to a directionless PCI, which is as we were in the middle of the 60's, when the center left was dead and there was no different strategy yet.

[Question] Yet forced loans to support businesses in crisis is in itself a populist action.

[Answer] I deny that. On the other hand, in the context of a package that sought to make consensus as equable and well-supported as possible, it is a very important provision and would make possible a new role for the union. The fund that would be established would be managed by the unions, too; it could become the property of the companies and be a first step toward an Italian form of comanagement.

[Question] And toward the nationalization of what is left of private enterprise, and toward the end of a mixed economy.

[Answer] But we no longer have a mixed economy, not by a long shot! The basic problem is whether Italy should remain in series A, the 7 most industrialized countries, or go to series B, with Korea and Singapore. Series A means the democracy of alternance and, therefore, the PSI. As for series B, the DC and PCI may be able to pull it off.

[Question] What do you mean?

[Answer] I mean the country's Achilles heel is big business, both public and private, which has suffered severe blows in the last 10 years. We have to refinance to bind up the wounds and make big business able to meet the challenge of the 80's; if not, we won't be invited to Venice any more.

[Question] And how will that happen, Honorable De Michelis?

[Answer] By promoting industrial research and development and also by pouring resources into this project, as Fascism did in the 30's, when the public sector took a back seat.

[Question] But where are the resources?

[Answer] The banking system will have to take over the debts of the big groups to make up for setbacks and mobilize new resources--which are there--for a big recovery. Curiously, in this country, the industrial technostructures are thought of as being made up of animals, with bankers wallowing hedonistically in money. But bankers have made bad mistakes, which they must now rectify. The SIR decree is a first defeat for that high and mighty bankers' corporation. And it is only the first defeat.

[Question] These are long-term projects. Will this government last long enough? It was ready to fall at the end of July because of Cossiga's trial in the Donat Cattin case.

[Answer] Cossiga will certainly not fall because of the Donat Cattin case, because the case is inconsistent, and the Communists themselves will not force the issue. So this government will last long enough to create the conditions for more authoritative solutions based on consensus.

[Question] When will you be ready to give up the chairmanship of the Socialist Council?

[Answer] I am already ready, but the situation will have to mature until the PSI congress next November.

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BOURGEOIS PARTY LEADERS WRANGLE OVER POSSIBLE PRIME MINISTER

Benkow: Willoch My Candidate

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 9 Jul 80 p 6

[Interview with Jo Benkow, chairman of the Conservative Party, by Per-Arne Bjerke]

[Text] Statements by Jo Benkow, chairman of the Conservative Party, with reference to the Christian People's Party and the abortion question have made the squabble over bourgeois collaboration flare up again. Benkow has made it clear that in a bourgeois government the Christian People's Party will not have very good chances of putting its views on abortion through. In other matters as well, the Conservatives have begun to make demands of the coalition parties. The other day Rolf Presthus told ARBEIDERBLADET that the Conservatives will attach very great weight to their tax policy when any three-party government is patched together.

[Question] Will a bourgeois government pursue a pure Conservative policy, Jo Benkow?

[Answer] I won't stipulate any joint government program for the three parties here and now. But it is reasonable that the Conservative Party will get an opportunity to express itself. However, for us the most important thing is to ensure a bourgeois majority in the election.

[Question] Should the non-socialist government program be most strongly stamped by the Conservative Party's profile, provided the party gains as much as seems likely at the moment?

[Answer] The principle has always been that the parties shall have influence in proportion to their strength, but we are not interested in setting up unalterable demands.

[Question] Is there any question now of the Conservative Party's forming a government alone?

[Answer] If that turns out to be the only possible solution, we are ready to undertake the task. But there is A democratic guarantee in the government's having a parliamentary majority, and such a government is our primary aim.

[Question] Will the bourgeois parties go into the election with a common candidate for prime minister?

[Answer] I do not think it is the question of who shall be prime minister that counts most. What counts is that the parties show that they are capable of establishing a solid political coalition.

[Question] Is it reasonable for the Conservative Party, as the decidedly biggest party, to get the post of prime minister as well?

[Answer] If today's relative strengths hold for the election results, it will cause a sensation if the Conservative Party does not get the post of prime minister.

[Question] Who is the Conservative Party's candidate for prime minister?

[Answer] The party has never discussed the question. Personally, I favor Kåre Willoch for prime minister.

[Question] What about yourself? Have you no desire to be in the government?

[Answer] It is first and foremost a practical question whether the party chairman should also be represented in the government. I myself do not care so much where I work.

[Question] You say that the relative strength of the parties must be reflected in the government's political program. Does this also apply to the distribution of the ministries among the three bourgeois parties?

[Answer] I do not believe the people will understand it if the relative strength of the parties is not reflected in the composition of the government. But this does not necessarily mean that the Conservative Party will demand a majority in the government. Here we must also consider how great weight should be assigned to each ministry.

[Question] Is it out of the question for the Christian People's Party to get its stand on abortion accepted, since this is set as a requirement for participating in the government?

[Answer] Let me say that we are, of course, willing for the Christian People's Party to have its own view of the abortion question.
But I have not yet seen a party that has closed ranks behind the Christian

People's Party's stand on abortion. Nor is there any reason to believe that the Christian People's Party will determine the government's abortion program.

[Question] Do you believe that the majority of the Conservative Party's Storting group will be in favor of self-determined abortion after the election in 1981?

[Answer] It is impossible to answer such a question. The only thing I feel sure about is that the abortion issue will not characterize the nominations in the party. The individual's political competence will be decisive there.

[Question] Is the abortion conflict over in the Conservative Party?

[Answer] It seems so to me. Since the national meeting I have had only two letters that took up the abortion issue.

[Question] Now it is not just abortion that is the cause of collaboration discussion on the bourgeois side. That has been shown especially by the work in the Storting during the past year. How do you appraise the outlook for collaboration after the parties have failed time after time to reach agreement on a common bourgeois position?

[Answer] I do not believe the climate for collaboration is as bad as it is said to be. We have seen a desire for rapprochement, among other things in the energy policy. I am not so sure that the bourgeois differences are increasing, as has been asserted.

[Question] You are just as far apart on a number of issues, e.g. on the tax question. Do you go along with Rolf Presthus in saying that the Conservatives will make a breakthrough for their tax views in a non-socialist three-party government?

[Answer] I would not express myself that way. Taxes are a leading issue for us, but are still only a part of the economic policy that a bourgeois government will pursue.

[Question] Is there not a limit to the number of compromises that the Conservative Party, as the biggest party, is willing to enter into?

[Answer] We will not go into the coalition negotiations with such strong demands, even though we are the biggest. That will be our starting point.

[Question] Johan J. Jakobsen, chairman of the Center Party, has said that it may be hard to get a new unified bourgeois attitude toward the government's long-term program before the election. Do you agree with that?

[Answer] It has never been easy to reach unified positions. But we are ready to cooperate in making it succeed.

[Question] As the Conservative Party has grown great, there has been an expression within the party of diverging views on several central issues. How does the party chairman view the conflict between the liberal Conservatives and the Western Norway Conservatives?

[Answer] I have noticed that a number of so-called "insightful" commentators make a point of disagreements in the Conservative Party. But the reality is something else. All of the serious opinion polls show that we are a united and unified party.

Christian, Center Chiefs Answer

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 10 Jul 80 p 6

[Interview with Kåre Kristiansen, chairman of the Christian People's Party, and Johan J. Jakobsen, chairman of the Center Party, by Nils Ottar Ask]

> [Text] The Conservative Party's emphasis on strength within the bourgeois camp of late is greatly disliked by the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. Efforts at cooperation will be made still more difficult if the Conservative Party continues along this line, Kåre Kristiansen, chairman of the Christian People's Party, and Johan J. Jakobsen, chairman of the Center Party, tell ARBEIDERBLADET.

In response to the Conservative Party's demand for the prime minister's post in a possible bourgeois government, they make it clear that the KrF [Christian People's Party] and SP [Center Party] will have their candidates for that position. And the voters will be informed of the SP's candidate before the election, says Jakobsen.

After Jo Benkow, chairman of the Conservative Party group, made it clear the other day that the KrF cannot count on getting its position on abortion accepted under a possible bourgeois government, Benkow proclaimed yesterday through ARBEIDERBLADET that the Conservatives must get the post of prime minister in such a government if the relative strength of the three parties is the same after an election as today. Anything else would cause a sensation, said Benkow, who put Kåre Willoch forward as candidate for prime minister. The Conservative chairman also noted that in other matters as well, the party will demand acceptance of its program in proportion to its election results. But the Conservatives will also have internal problems; the Young Conservatives favor Erling Norvik for prime minister.

[Question] Is the KrF willing to give up Lars Korvald's claims as prime minister in a bourgeois government, Kåre Kristiansen?

[Answer] Korvald is our candidate as before, but we do not think it is time to start putting a government together. There are many things that must be clarified before that can be done. It seems to me, therefore, that Benkow and others as well could profitably leave that question alone for the time being, and concentrate instead on laying the foundations for a bourgeois government coalition. I hope the Conservative Party does not make the conditions for collaboration more difficult than they have become since the party took its stand on abortion.

[Question] You have expressed the view that Benkow is driving a harder line with reference to you and the SP than the Conservative Party has done before?

[Answer] Well, I have at least known the Conservative Party to anticipate the course of events to suit itself, just as the party chairman is doing now. But when it comes to Benkow's statements about the post of prime minister and the division of strength in a possible bourgeois government, I do not regard these as any ultimatum. In the political early season we are now in, such statements are weighed more heavily than at other times.

[Question] But surely Benkow's clear statements should be given just as great weight in the summer months?

[Answer] Yes, of course. But I hope, as I said, that the Conservative Party will not put obstacles in the way of efforts to lay the foundation for a bourgeois government after the election in 1981.

[Question] Does it not seem to you that the voters should have a chance to know before the election what sort of policy a bourgeois government will pursue, and who will lead such a government?

[Answer] I cannot see that it is absolutely necessary to present any government program and point out the prime minister beforehand. But we will contribute to arriving at a common reaction on the government's long-term program.

[Question] What does the SP think about the Conservatives' having to get the prime minister's post in a bourgeois government, Party Chairman Johan J. Jakobsen?

[Answer] The composition of a non-socialist government is a question we must wait with until after the election. Starting a public discussion of that now would not serve our common desire for a change of government. What is important now is to create a foundation for a non-socialist majority. Anyway, I do not regard Benkow's statements as any ultimatum.

[Question] But should not the voters get a clear idea of what they are getting into with a bourgeois government before they vote?

[Answer] In our democratic system it should be acceptable for the individual parties to go into an election on their own programs. Afterwards the election results determine what alternative government possibilities there can be. In principle it is clear that voter support should be reflected in the composition of a multiparty government, but not necessarily on the basis of a mathematical division. I can point, for example, to earlier non-socialist governments in which the biggest party did not furnish the prime minister.

[Question] Does that mean that the SP will support the KrF and Korvald as prime minister?

[Answer] I see little purpose in discussing either the prime minister's post or the other posts in such a government at the present time.

[Question] Will the SP have a candidate of its own for prime minister?

[Answer] We will not renounce at the outstart any specific post in a government in which the SP participates. That applies to the post of prime minister, too.

[Question] Will the voters be informed before the election who the SP's candidate is for prime minister?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Who is it?

[Answer] We shall have to come back to that later.

[Question] Does it seem to the SP, too, that the Conservative Party is taking a harder line toward the SP and KrF than before?

[Answer] I do not like the Conservatives' ultimatum-like tone in the abortion question. It was also somewhat surprising for the reason that it was precisely the Conservative Party that created the problem with regard to that issue. It may give the impression that the Conservatives' position was adopted for the sake of convenience and an acceptance of free abortion.

[Question] What do you think of the Conservatives' emphasis on strength otherwise?

[Answer] I think the Conservatives should be cautious about emphasizing strength as strongly as the party has been doing recently. Besides, when Conservative spokesmen try to suggest the probability of a pure Conservative government, that may weaken the chances of creating a parliamentary basis for a non-socialist government.

Nordli Comments on Opponents

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 11 Jul 80 p 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Od Nordli by Nils Ottar Ask]

> [Excerpts] Prime Minister Od Nordli is following with interest the domestic quarrel in the bourgeois camp at present. But the fact that the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Center Party are publicly pulling in different directions in essential political questions, in the prime minister's opinion, reveals nothing new in the political landscape.

"It may perhaps seem a little odd that I say that when the three bourgeois parties are so strongly evidencing disunity in essential matters. But the thing is that there is fundamental disagreement at the outset between the three parties, and that these days that is coming to the surface again. I see no new elements in this discussion that they have under way. But the disunity reminds us again that no uniting political basis exists for collaboration among the three. And also that no uniting political basis can be established without one or more of these parties having to give in quite essentially on questions that are very central for the particular party. The Conservative Party's strong showing these days shows, as I have commented earlier, that any coalition government formed of the three is bound to be strongly marked by the Conservative Party and its policy."

[Question] What if the Conservative Party is aiming at forming a government alone, as the party has indicated may become a possibility?

[Answer] I am not ignoring the fact that the Conservative Party wants that and is aiming at a pure Conservative government after the election. But in any case such a government must build on the premise that the other two bourgeois parties will take on both sponsorship and the obligation to contribute. I can promise at least that the Labor Party will not give support directly or indirectly to such a government.

Mortally Afraid

[Question] Would not such a move as a pure Conservative government before the election be a tactical advantage for the Labor Party?

[Answer] For my whole conscious political life I have been mortally afraid of a pure Conservative government. If the KrF and SP acted as godparents to such a government it would not be more reliable on that account. I will do my utmost to keep such a government from surviving long. That question must not be evaluated tactically, but by the consequences it would have for the policy that we think society is served by.

[Question] The government got support from the Liberal Party on the important question of the law regulating income. Have there not been

indications earlier from AP [Labor Party] quarters that closer cooperation between the AP and the Liberal Party could be considered in future years?

[Answer] The government is glad that the Liberal Party assumed a responsibility and stood up for it during the negotiations on the law regulating income. But I do not believe that either the government or the Liberal Party read anything more into that than a collaboration on that important issue. What may be considered in the future would be hypothetical to discuss generally today. Our job is to gather strength around a continued AP government.

[Question] Do you think the voters have a right to know before the election what policy a possible bourgeois multiparty government would pursue?

[Answer] Yes, absolutely so. The AP for its part will go to the voters asking for support for an AP government. And the voters will not be in doubt as to what policy such a government will stand for in important questions. If the three bourgeois parties leave the government question open before the election, there is obviously a different situation with regard to political clarification among the three.

[Question] Should the voters also know before the election who will lead a possible bourgeois government?

[Answer] Well, the chairman of the Conservative Party has said clearly who he thinks should be prime minister in such a government. In principle I would regard it as an advantage for such a question to be clarified, too, before the election. But at the same time, I see problems with that. In such a situation the election results should be made the basis, and we do not know them until after the election.

[Question] How about the AP? Will you be the party's candidate for prime minister at the time of the election?

[Answer] I will answer that question in good time before the election.

Don't Know

[Question] Being prime minister is not the most comfortable of jobs. How long can you last at it?

(Nordli takes a pause to think.)

[Answer] I do not know. I still have health and strength in reserve, although it is wearing from time to time. But it is not simply a question of how long one can hold out in such an exposed situation. It is a question that the party organs must be free to evaluate at any time. As for my own view of it, I will say what I think in good time.

Strengthening

[Question] Are you pleased with the way the government is functioning since the last reshuffle?

[Answer] When the new government was presented, it was said in critical quarters that it had a range of political views that bordered on a daring experiment. What I can say now is that the collegium has completely fulfilled what my aim was: to be a welded-together, effective group. The range of views has been an element of strength for the government.

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REPORTER DEFENDS COST EFFECTIVENESS OF JAS PLANE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Gösta Hellbeck]

> [Text] "I do not know where Maj Wechselmann buys her gold, but I most decidedly advise her to continue to do business in the same shop." That is the comment of Gösta Hellbeck, free-lance journalist, former editorial writer for NORRKÖPINGS TIDNINGAR. Maj Wechselmann insisted in DAGENS NYHETER, 14 May, that the new Swedish military plane JAS costs as much per kilogram as pure gold or more.

In an article in DAGENS NYHETER, 14 May, Maj Wechselmann asserted that the Swedish people are facing a serious and unwished-for threat to neutrality. The threat is created by a planned future collaboration with the FRG on development of the new Swedish military plane JAS (Pursuit/Attack/Reconnaissance), which is being discussed as a successor to the System 37 Viggen.

In principle it is correct that Swedish neutrality depends in part on our real independence of foreign military suppliers. But the Swedish freedom of alliances also demands that the equipment, e.g. aircraft, maintain a certain minimum standard. In other words, it must be clear to the world around us that we can defend ourselves with our own equipment. Sweden is a small country, which will probably be compelled in the future to procure our technology from abroad for our aircraft to give the performance that is required for the world around us to get the aforementioned insight.

Inasmuch as Wechselmann does not suggest any alternative of her own to a continued Swedish aircraft development, it is hard to know what she thinks. Shall we buy *finished* foreign planes, or shall we have no air force at all? As far as I can see, the idea that we should buy finished planes is in conflict with her aversion to Sweden's initiating any collaboration at all with foreign countries. For that would make us even more dependent

on foreign powers than would be the case with a collaboration. On the other hand, Maj Wechselmann demonstrates a solid opposition to Swedish military planes of any kind. Ever since she made her herostratically famous film about Viggen she has devoted her efforts to combatting the Swedish aircraft industry and Swedish defense.

Maj Wechselmann has called the JAS "Europe's perhaps most advanced reconnaissance-attack plane." She sees that as the inescapable result of a possible collaboration now under discussion with the West German aircraft mannufacturer MBB (Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm GmbH). MBB, in collaboration with a French and a British concern, developed a combat aircraft--the Tornado (MRCA [multirole combat aircraft])--which like other large attack planes can carry nuclear weapons.

From Maj Wechselmann's article one gets the impression that the mere collaboration with MBB would automatically give the JAS the same capacity as the MRCA--as a result of a sort of contagion, whether we want it or not. The truth is that the JAS is a plane which with its 8 tons is about half the size of Viggen, which in turn is considerably smaller than Tornado.

Maj Wechselmann also scares us, as is her wont, with the enormous costs that the JAS will impose on the Swedish people. She has done one of her fabulous arithmetical stunts and arrived at the conclusion that the JAS will be as costly as pure gold or actually more costly per kilogram.

I do not know where Mrs Wechselmann buys her gold, but I most decidedly advise her to continue to do business with the same shop. At the price at which gold is quoted on the international commodity market, Viggen would cost 1 billion kronor per unit (Viggen's weight in kilograms times the price of 1 kg of gold), an amount for which the Swedish armed forces get at least 20 planes, for the price per unit is less than 50 million.

The total lifetime costs for a Viggen plane--including spare parts, fuel, armament, servicing, etc.--are less than 100 million kronor. A JAS worth its weight in gold would be about 500 million kronor, but the JAS is calculated at a cost that is about 60 percent of Viggen's, or somewhere around 30 million kronor.

The most serious thing about Maj Wechselmann, however, is her sublime scorn for figures that do not fit in with her purposes. For she must have some purpose in her "message." But she herself does not let us know what that purpose is. One may ask rhetorically what will happen if Sweden does not defend its territorial air against encroachments, and thus neglects to defend the country's borders and sovereignty. Which of the superpowers will then be ready to assume the responsibility? The answer is that both will presumably feel called upon to do so.

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SWISS CITIZENS SOCIETY HOLDS CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 12 Jul 80 p 21

[Article by C.W.; "Foreign Policy Lectures in Muerren"]

[Text] Muerren, 10 July--On Thursday, Josef Luns, general secretary of NATO, Willibald Pahr, Austria's minister for foreign affairs, and Pierre Aubert, chief of the Federal Political Department, where in Muerren to express their opinions on various foreign policy topics. The lectures took place within the framework of a course organized by the Swiss Citizens Soviety, and they were presented one after the other but there were no cross-references.

Answer to Soviet Expansion

In the opinion of NATO's general secretary, the development in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan put the Western Alliance to a crucial test, the essential points of which have been met in the meantime. Luns proceeded from the assumption that NATO had accomplished two of its goals, the protection of its territory and the preservation of independence for its members; on the other hand, in East-West relations distrust and fear had again increased substantially as early as toward the end of last year. The Soviet Union had reached an alarming military superiority and now, for the first time, it had moved its own troops into a Third World country. It is a sign that there has been no change with regard to its expansionist goals and that it looks upon detente as a method that is limited with respect to time and locality. Consequently, NATO members must cooperate militarily and, above all, also politically leave no doubt about their determination that such an act must not be repeated under any circumstances; it would especially threaten the Western oil supply, but it could also affect a country that is located closer to them. Even the Tehran hostage affair is raising a basic question, since the Soviet Union's position has been one of opportunism.

In Lun's opinion, the Western reply was perhaps not always unequivocal and decisive enough. Nevertheless, in spite of differences of opinion

concerning the manner of reaction, words had been followed by deeds and all alliance partners had demanded withdrawal from Afghanistan. To be sure, at the present time there was no indication that the Soviet Union is making an attempt to find a way out. Nevertheless, the position of many governments toward the Moscow Olympic games and the U.S. embargo measures did not remain hidden from the Soviet population, and even East European state officials privately indicated their criticism of the Afghan adventure, so that the Soviet Union must some day give an account of the negative balance of the invasion, because of the resistance in Afghanistan and also from a military point of view.

Luns concluded his statements by pointing to other problems of the NATO countries, particularly the energy question, and he ended on a guardedly optimistic note with the prospect of the restoration of a balance.

Swiss Foreign Policy

In his lecture on Swiss foreign policy, Federal Council Member Aubert also touched on the current tensions in East-West relations. It is important that during the upcoming Madrid Conference there will be open and free discussions--without accusing anybody in particular--on the implementation of the Helsinki declarations, which had been violated on a number of points by the invasion of Afghanistan, and in spite of certain positive effects the hoped-for results had not materialized, for instance, in the area of human rights. With regard to disarmament, discussions would be limited to the procedures to be followed for the next step. Other than that, Aubert expressed the hope that Switzerland would ratify the European Social Charter, and he advocated an increase in state and multilateral development aid. In his opinion, joining the United Nations would be a natural consequence of our current policies; the United Nations as such could not be held responsible for the policies of its members, and the rejection of participation would more or less amount to the same thing as a rejection of today's world.

Aubert made these statements against the background of history and the institutional problems of our foreign policy. In the process, he demonstrated how the elements of the Swiss role--continual neutrality, defense readiness in military, economic and spiritual respects and, finally, the avoidance of isolation through solidarity, universality and availability in relationships--developed in the course of various ups and downs. Even today, the structure of relations with the outside, which until the establishment of the Confederation frequently lacked unity, still occupies a special position in the political decision-making process. According to Aubert, the extreme caution which is apparent can be traced back to domestic policy factors, to federalism, direct democracy and the rejection of purely governmental action; it is, therefore, up to the press, to associations and Parliament--which should regularly conduct general discussions as well--to get more involved in these essential areas of politics.

The United Nations and Austria's Sovereignty

United Nations membership, which i Switzerland is still disputed, is considered by Austria a central el nt of an independent and neutral foreigh policy of a small country. 'nister for Foreign Affairs Pahr drew un extraordinarily positive balance : 25 years of Austrian participation, which began shortly after the reestablishment of full sovereignty with the State Treaty of 1955. Aspirations to achieve this goal existed already before that date. With that in mind, Pahr did not actually want to draw parallels between the experiences of this country and others, although the alternating effect of neutrality and UN membership also leads to their compatibility.

After World War II, Austria was interested in finding recognition without unilateral ties and--particularly because of its exposed location--in participating in the guarantee of peaceful relations. According to Pahr, the tradition of the multinational state produced an affinity for the idea of internatinnal tolerance, which is advocated by the United Nations. Austria is using the forum of the General Assembly for its own requests--national independence (already in 1952) and later a solution to the South Tirolean conflict--as well as for initiatives in the interest of others. Pahr mentioned particularly the initiatives in the Near East conflict and the North-South dialog, as well as the participation in peacekeeping operations by supplying contingents of "Blue Helmets." At the same time, a straight-forward policy is being pursued, which--as was confirmed by later investigations--most closely resembles the policy of the small neutral state of Sweden. Membership in the Security Council (1973 and 1974), the establishment of a third UN center in Vienna and the election of Kurt Waldheim as secretary-general are concrete proof of success of a policy which, according to Pahr, is supported by a broad consensus of the population. In general, the necessity of a comprehensive international organization was also underlined by the Austrian minister for foreign affairs in those arguments that were presented in Switzerland, although they were toned down somewhat. Federal Council Member Aubert was no longer present at the lecture, and, surprisingly, a discussion with the public fell by the wayside.

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